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INTRODUCTION
It is apparent that multilateral institutions like the Bank, the IMF and the
WTO need to be continuously reminded of the human rights obligations
established by international law. To borrow from Asbjorn Eide, these
comprise the obligations to "respect," "protect" and "fulfill." More im-
portantly, [multilateral institutions] must also respect and apply those
standards to their own internal processes of policy formulation, or else
those obligations cease to be of any import.'
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank often have a deci-
sive say in determining a State's economic policies and priorities. The
1. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE POLICY AND PRACTICE;
WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED BY J. OLOKA-ONYANGO AND DEEPIKA UDAGAMA, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SUB-COMMISSION RESOLUTION 1998/12, para. 36, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/l 1 (1999) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER].
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human consequences of Bank and Fund policies can be far-reaching. Yet
the impression is that sufficient account has not been taken of the conse-
quences and the human rights implications of their actions, that these are
regarded as someone else's responsibility, not the institutions' or the
economists'. The dialogue with the Bretton Woods institutions and the
World Trade Organization must, therefore, be intensified. All of the pro-
grams and policies pursued by the IMF and the World Bank should be
consistent with international human rights standards.
2
A. THE WORLD BANK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
CONCERN
As the above quotes indicate, the relationship between the World
Bank's ("Bank") policies and operations and international human
rights standards is the subject of high level international scrutiny and
concern. World leaders3 and institutions such as the European Par-
liament have made calls to amend the Bank's Articles of Agreement
to ensure that human rights issues are addressed.' The perception that
the Bank's policies and practices, both directly and indirectly, are at
odds with human rights is widespread, and in many respects, justi-
fied. This perception is not new and dates back to the late 1960s and
early 1970s.1
While the Bank widely publicizes what it perceives to be its con-
tribution to the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, it
openly disregards a whole range of rights that it determines to be
"political" and, therefore, beyond the mandate of its Articles of
2. Mary Robinson, On the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, Statement on the
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 7, 1998),
at http://www.cyberhomepage.com/50"-a.html.
3. See Blair Calls for Urgent Reforn of IMF. World Bank, Bus. DAY, Sept.
22, 1998, at I (discussing British Prime Minister Tony Blair's request that the IMF
and World Bank's founding treaties be rewritten).
4. See J. Verspaget, Report on the Activities of the Bretton Woods Institutions
(World Bank and International Monetar" Fund). Eur. Parl. Ass., Doc. No. 7256
(1995).
5. See James Gathii, Human Rights, the World Bank and the Washington
Consensus: 1949-1999, 94 AM. SOC'Y OF lNT'L L. 144 (2000) (describing claims
that the World Bank's support for the international bill of human rights was insuf-
ficient, given the organization's influence in the international arena).
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Agreement.6 Not only is this distinction arbitrary and inconsistently
applied, but it also runs counter to mainstream thought about the na-
ture of human rights and attendant international obligations. Moreo-
ver, while the Bank in some cases plays a positive role in promoting
economic, social, and cultural rights, it has never undertaken a sys-
tematic evaluation of the impact of its operations on human rights in
order to support its claims. Ample evidence demonstrates that in
many cases Bank policies and operations have had a negative impact
on not only civil and political rights, but also on the enjoyment of
economic, social, and cultural rights.' This has prompted, among
others, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the intergovernmental body that monitors the U.N. Conven-
tion of the same name, to comment on the impact of Bank operations
on human rights. In 1990, the Committee stated that:
Development co-operation activities do not automatically contribute to
the promotion of respect for economic, social and cultural rights. Many
activities undertaken in the name of 'development' have subsequently
been recognized as ill conceived and even counter-productive in human
rights terms. In order to reduce the incidence of such problems, the whole
range of issues dealt with in the [Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights] should, wherever possible and appropriate, be given care-
ful and specific consideration.. .As a matter of principle, the appropriate
United Nations organs and agencies should specifically recognize the in-
timate relationship which should be established between development ac-
tivities and efforts to promote respect for human rights in general, and
6. See WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROL, OF i'ii
WORLD BANK (1998); UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE WORLD BANK
AND THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; SUBMISSION TO THE 1993 VIENNA
WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/61/Add.19
(1993); Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the
Legal Issues and the Record ofAchievements, 17 DENVER J INT'L LAW & POLICY
39, 43-47 (1988) (providing examples of the Bank's policy against involving itself
in political matters).
7. The Bank's own study on its operations involving resettlement provides
stark evidence of substantial denials of economic, social and cultural rights. See
ENVIRONMENT DEPARTMENT, WORLD BANK, RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENF:
THE BANKWIDE REVIEW OF PROJECTS INVOLVING INVOLUNTARY RESETTLI.MENT,
1986-1993 (1996) [hereinafter RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT]. (J." J. Oloka-
Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and So-
cial Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 20-29 (1995) (discussing the nega-
tive impact of Bank operations on civil and political, as well as economic, social,
and cultural rights in Africa).
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economic, social and cultural rights in particulars
And again in 1998:
The Committee calls upon the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank to pay enhanced attention in their activities to respect for
economic, social and cultural rights, including through encouraging ex-
plicit recognition of these rights, assisting in the identification of country-
specific benchmarks to facilitate their promotion, and facilitating the de-
velopment of appropriate remedies for responding to violations.9
The Committee has also begun to systematically question report-
ing states on whether they account for human rights when casting
their votes at the Bank and, in the case of borrowing states, whether
they have engaged in a dialogue with the Bank about human rights in
their proposed projects and other interactions with the Bank.'"
Similarly, in its Resolution 1998/12, the U.N. Sub-commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as it was
known in 1998, stated that it was "convinced of the need to re-
emphasize the centrality and primacy of human rights obligations in
all areas of governance and development, including international and
regional trade, investment and financial policies, agreements and
practices."" Accordingly, this resolution "urge[d] United Nations
8. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MEASURES (ART. 22 OF THE COVENANT); GENERAL COMMENT No. 2,
paras. 7, 8(a), U.N. Doc. E/1990/23 (1990).
9. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTIEE ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS; STATEMENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, at http:// www.unhchr.ch/ tbs/ doc.nsf/ Master-
FrameView/ adc44375895aa10d8025668f003Cc06e?Opendocument (May 11,
1998).
10. See SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF TIlE WORLD
BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 134 (Cavendish Publishing Ltd.
2001).
11. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUB-COMMISSION
ON PREVENTION ON DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS AS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL
POLICY, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2f1998/12 (1998) (expressing the organization's
concern over international human rights abuses and resolving to take steps to ad-
dress that concern in the future).
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agencies, including the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, to at all times be conscious of and respect the human rights
obligations of the countries with which they work."' 2 The resolution
further authorized a study on human rights and international devel-
opment, trade, and investment, joining the Sub-commission with the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in scrutinizing
the impact of the Bank's operations on human rights.'3 The Sub-
commission and the Commission on Human Rights have also raised
concerns about Bank operations in their thematic work, addressing
involuntary resettlement, the impact of structural adjustment policies
on economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to food. 4
Read together with the statements heading this paper, the preced-
ing quotations highlight three different, although interrelated, aspects
of human rights concerns related to the Bank's work: 1) the Bank's
own internal policies and their relationship to human rights; 2) the
human rights impact and implications of the Bank's operations as
related to the obligations of the Bank's members; and 3) the obliga-
12. Id.
13. See id. (resolving to prepare a working paper suggesting ways the United
Nations can promote consideration of human rights in international trade and in-
vestment transactions). The first phase of this study was issued as: HUMAN RIGtlTS
AS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND
FINANCE POLICY AND PRACTICE. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 1. Oloka-
Onyango and Udagama later released GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPACT ON TIlE
FULL ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUB-COMMISSION ON PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS; PRELIMINARY REPORT SUBMITTED BY J. OLOKA-ONYANGO AND DEEPIKA
UDAGAM, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUB-COMMISSION RESOLUTION 1999/8, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/2000/13 (2000).
14. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, FORCED EVICTIONS; ANALYTICAL REPORT COMPILED BY TIlE
SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO COMMISSION RESOLUTION 1993/77, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1994/20 (1994) [hereinafter FORCED EVICTIONS] (identifying struc-
tural adjustment policies as one of the leading causes of involuntary resettlement);
UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE HIGHLY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE: A HUMAN
RIGHTS ASSESSMENT OF THE POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS (PRSP);
REPORT SUBMITTED BY MR. FANTU CHERU, INDEPENDENT EXPERT ON TIlE
EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND FOREIGN DEBT ON TIlE FULL
ENJOYMENT OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/56 (2001) (describing the inflexibility
of the World Bank Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative).
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tions that the Bank may have to account for human rights in its op-
erational sphere as an institution and subject of international law.
Professor Daniel Bradlow defines the former as "institutional" and
the latter as "operational" human rights issues.'5 Institutional human
rights issues focus "on the responsibilities of the IFIs [International
Financial Institutions] to ensure that their own internal operating
rules and procedures are consistent with internationally recognized
human rights standards;" the operational issues "pertain to the human
rights impact of the IFIs' operations in their member states," and fo-
cus "on the IFIs' responsibilities for ensuring that the design and im-
plementation of their projects, programs, policies and in-country ac-
tivities are consistent with internationally recognized human rights
standards."''6
B. RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
The increased international scrutiny of the World Bank on human
rights grounds coincides with a general trend among multi- and bilat-
eral development actors, including U.N. Specialized Agencies, to
adopt a "rights-based approach" to development or to tie their pro-
grammatic work to human rights standards. 7 The High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, for instance, is working with U.N. devel-
opment agencies to mainstream human rights in their operations.,s
The U.N. Development Program ("U.N.DP") has explicitly adopted a
general rights-based approach to development, while others such as
the U.N. Childrens' Fund ("U.N.ICEF") and the U.N. Development
Fund for Women ("U.N.IFEM") have tied their programmatic work
15. See Daniel Bradlow, The World Bank, the IIF and luman Rights, 6
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 51 (1996) (asserting human rights trou-
bles common to international financial institutions).
16. Id.
17. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMErT AS FREEDOM (1998) (setting
forth the work of the Nobel Prize winning economist from which much of the re-
cent thought about rights-based approaches to development has originated).
18. See UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGIITS, OPEN-ENDED
WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, TIlE RIGIIT TO DE\'ELOPIENT;
REPORT OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS SUBMITTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 54/175, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/WG.18/CRP.2 (2000) (describing the efforts of the High Commis-
sioner to organize meetings with other groups).
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to the human rights conventions related to their mandates: the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, respec-
tively.,,
A rights-based approach to development is one that explicitly ties
development policies, objectives, projects, and outputs to interna-
tional human rights standards requiring that development be directed
towards fulfilling human rights. Conversely, it is a proactive strategy
for converting rights into development goals and standards. For ex-
ample, health, education, or land reform projects will be informed,
framed by, and substantially directed towards fulfilling the proce-
dural and substantive aspects of the associated rights. In essence, this
converts development goals and objectives into rights, entitlements,
responsibility and accountability. This approach comports with the
U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development proclaimed by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1986.20 The General Assembly adopted
the declaration with only one vote against and eight abstentions."'
19. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, INTEGRATING HUIAN
RIGHTS WITH SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT; A U.N.DP POLICY
DOCUMENT, at http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/policy5.html (Jan. 1998); UNIrIED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, at
http://www.undp.org/hdr2000 (June 2000); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOP'vl ENI'
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORT ON Till. OSLO
SYMPOSIUM. 2-3 OCTOBER 1998, at http://www.undp.org/hdlro/Oslorep l.html (Oct.
2, 1998).
20. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT; REPORT OF TIlE lNDEIPENDINT
EXPERT ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT, DR. ARJUN SENGUPTA, PURSUANT TO
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 52/175 AND COvIMISSION ON HUMIAN RIGIlTS
RESOLUTION E/CN.4/RES/2000/5, para. 19, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/WG. 1 8/CRP. 1 (2000). The report states:
[A] human rights approach to development can be very well seen as human
development carried out in a manner fulfilling human rights. Such an ap-
proach is specified in the Declaration on the Right to Development and sub-
sequent international resolutions as a participatory, accountable and transpar-
ent process with equity in decision making and sharing of the fruits or
outcomes of the process as well as maintaining all the civil and political
rights. The objectives of development are set up as claims or entitlements of
rights-holders which duty-bearers are expected to protect and promote, re-
specting international human rights standards based on equity and justice.
See id.
21. Declaration on the Right to Development, Dec. 4, 1986, U.N. GAOR, 41st
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Current discussion on a rights-based approach to development
within the U.N. and elsewhere does not focus on the wisdom of such
an approach, which appears to be generally accepted, but rather fo-
cuses on how it can be implemented. While the Bank has participated
in some of the discussions about implementing the right to develop-
ment, and maintains that its approach to poverty alleviation is aimed
at realizing economic, social and cultural rights, the Bank remains
conspicuously absent from the larger discussion about adopting a
rights-based approach to development.
C. INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN
RIGHTS
The human rights of indigenous peoples have also warranted a
high level of international scrutiny and action in recent years, both
generally and specifically in connection with the Bank's activities
and policies. Indeed, it would be accurate to say that indigenous peo-
ples' rights have become a large and permanent part of the intergov-
ernmental human rights agenda in the past twenty years, during
which time international standards have evolved and strengthened
considerably. This evolution includes both international standard
setting exercises leading to or resulting in formal instruments on in-
digenous rights,22 incorporation of some of those rights in interna-
tional instruments on environment and development,2 and protection
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doe. A/41/53 (1987).
22. See generally, Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries (explaining how the developments in interna-
tional law since 1957 have resulted in the need to adopt new standards regarding
the rights of indigenous peoples), at http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/menu3/b/62.htm
(June 27, 1989); UNITED NATIONS. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DRAFT UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON TlE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON
PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES ON ITS FORTY-
SIXTH SESSION, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994); Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Proposed American Declaration on the
Rights on Indigenous Peoples, at http://www.cidh.oas.orglIndigenous.htm (Feb.
26, 1997). The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights recently es-
tablished a Working Group on Indigenous People in Africa. See Resolution on the
Rights of hndigenous People/Coninnities in Africa, African Comm'n on Human
& Peoples' Rights, 28th Sess. (Nov. 6, 2000).
23. See Convention on Biological Diversity (demonstrating that the writers of
the Convention on Biological Diversity considered the rights of indigenous peo-
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of indigenous peoples' rights under human rights instruments of gen-
eral application.24
These changes at the international level have prompted, and to a
lesser extent reflected, a multitude of constitutional, legislative, jtu-
risprudential, and policy changes at the domestic level. 25 Taken in its
totality, this evolution of juridical thought and practice has led many
to conclude that some indigenous rights have attained the status of
customary international law, therefore, binding states regardless of
whether they have ratified the relevant treaties.26 Professor Siegfried
Wiessner, for instance, concludes that state practice and opinio juris
permit the "identification of specific rules of a customary interna-
pie), at http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp (Aug. 30, 2001); Agenda 21
for Change (explaining how Agenda 21 addressed the roles of indigenous people),
at http://iisd 1.iisd.ca/rio+5/agenda/agenda2l .htm (Nov. 10, 2001).
24. See infra Part III (discussing the treatment of indigenous rights under in-
struments of general application). The term "general application" refers to human
rights instruments not exclusively or specifically focused on indigenous peoples.
Id.
25. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO LAND; FINAL
WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, MRS. ERICA-IRENE A.
DAES, paras. 105-113, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (2001) (detailing inclu-
sion of indigenous peoples' land rights in nations' constitutional amendments and
new legislation).
26. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-
58, 107 (1996) (citing the International Labour Organisation Convention Number
169 as indicative of a trend that extends rights to indigenous peoples through inter-
national agreements); Siegfried Wiessner, The Rights and Status of Indigenous
Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. H UM.
RTS. J. 57, 127 (1999) (noting the development and crystallization of customary
norms protecting indigenous peoples' rights); Raizda Torres, The Rights ofjIndige-
nous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127
(examining domestic and international mechanisms for establishing an indigenous
rights norm); Catherine J. lorns Magallanes, International Human Rights and Their
Impact on Domestic Law on Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and
New Zealand, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEw
ZEALAND 238 (Paul Havemann ed., 1999) (citing S. James Anaya's statement that
"since the 1970s international law has reflected 'a new generation of international
consensus on indigenous peoples' rights"'). Anaya goes on to argue that "further
significant international legal developments provide evidence that customary inter-
national law has accepted the right of cultural self-determination for indigenous
peoples and the consequent autonomous control necessary to achieve that." i. at
242-43.
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tional law of indigenous peoples." 27 These rules relate to several ar-
eas.
First, indigenous peoples are entitled to maintain and develop their dis-
tinct cultural identity, their spirituality, their language, and their tradi-
tional ways of life. Second, they hold the right to political, economic, and
social self-determination, including a wide range of autonomy and the
maintenance and strengthening of their own systems of justice. Third, in-
digenous peoples have a right to demarcation, ownership, development,
control, and use of the lands they have traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied and used. Fourth, governments are to honor and faithfully ob-
serve their treaty commitments to indigenous nations.2
Whether some indigenous rights have attained the status of cus-
tomary international law is an important issue as it relates to the hu-
man rights obligations of the Bank and its Members.2 9 However, this
status, by itself, does not determine the existence of obligations. The
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee," the Committee on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD"), 3 '
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, and others have all firmly
established that indigenous rights and corresponding obligations ex-
ist under the general human rights instruments that fall within their
respective areas of competence. While the Bank is not party to any of
these instruments, its status as a subject of international law and as a
member of the U.N. family confers a number of obligations with re-
gard to the rights set forth therein and human rights in general. 2
27. Wiessner, supra note 26, at 127.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 138-147 and accompanying text (attempting to define the
rights of indigenous peoples in relation to the Bank's members).
30. One hundred forty-seven states have ratified the Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights as of October 22, 2001. See Status of Ratifications of the Principal
International Human Rights Treaties [hereinafter Status of Treaties] (displaying all
the signatories to the treaty), at http://www.unhchr.clhlpdfireport.pdf (Nov. 10,
2001).
31. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 60 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]. One hundred
fifty-nine states have ratified CERD as of October 22, 2001. See Status of Treaties,
supra note 30.
32. See infra Part II (outlining the Bank's position in the realm of international
2002]
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The Bank has previously acknowledged that indigenous peoples
require special attention, as they are especially vulnerable to negative
effects caused by Bank-funded operations.33 To account for this, the
Bank has adopted a number of policy statements that attempt to pro-
vide safeguards for indigenous peoples.34 In 1991, for instance, it
adopted Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples ("OD
4.20"). 35 OD 4.20's broad objective is, "to ensure that the develop-
ment process fosters full respect for [indigenous peoples'] dignity,
human rights and cultural uniqueness."36 This statement is repeated
in paragraph one of the draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous
Peoples, a revision of OD 4.20.17 In principle then, Bank policies and
activities should be informed by, account for and respect Indigenous
peoples' human rights.
This article examines one intersection of human rights issues and
World Bank activities: how the Bank's draft Operational Policy 4. 10
on Indigenous Peoples ("OP 4.10") compares to international human
rights standards pertaining to indigenous peoples. This analysis is
framed by a larger discussion of whether the Bank has international
legal obligations-especially the nature and extent of those obliga-
tions-to account for and respect indigenous peoples' human rights
in its policy setting and operational processes. I begin with a brief
look at the World Bank's attitude towards human rights and the role
of these rights in the development process.
law, leading to its human rights obligations).
33. See WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20
ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, para. 3 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter OD 4.20] (defining the
term "indigenous peoples" as those people whose minority status puts them at sig-
nificant risk in the development process), at
http://wbln00l8.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/tocall/0 F7 D6
F3F04DD70398525672C007D08ED?OpenDocument.
34. See, e.g., id. (detailing some of the statements made by the Bank to provide
safeguards).
35. Id.
36. Id. para. 6.
37. See WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL POLICy 4.10,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, para. 1 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter OP 4.10], at
http://lnweb 18.worldbank.org/essd/fe699bec4e6aleff8526a6bOO8Ob5d7?Open Docu
ment.
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I. DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
ROLE AND ATTITUDE OF THE WORLD BANK
The Bank has no formal, written policy on human rights, either in
terms of the Bank's role, or lack thereof, in promoting and requiring
respect for human rights in its operations or internally in terms of its
policies. OP 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples remains the only opera-
tional policy that explicitly mentions human rights and the Bank has
never officially stated its understanding of the term "human rights"
in that directive.38 Consequently, attitudes toward human rights must
be deduced from the statements of Bank officials, its publications,
and practices. From this we can see that the Bank has progressed
from outright rejection of human rights in the 1960s to cautious en-
gagement in a few, defined areas. However, this engagement is still
qualified by an arbitrary distinction between rights of a political na-
ture and rights related to economic or social well being.
In recent years, the Bank has been more forthcoming about what it
perceives its role to be in promoting human rights and the place of
human rights in overall development and poverty reduction efforts.
In his 1999 Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework,
for instance, the President of the Bank stated unequivocally that
"without the protection of human and property rights, and a compre-
hensive framework of laws, no equitable development is possible."3
This statement comports with the review of attitudes among multi-
and bilateral development actors conducted by the Development As-
sistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development ("OECD").4" The OECD review stated that "to
achieve sustainable development, it is necessary to address economic
38. See generally OD 4.20, supra note 33 (failing to set forth the Bank's under-
standing of "human rights").
39. Memorandum from James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, to
the Board, Management, and Staff of the World Bank Group, 10 (Jan. 21, 1999)
(discussing effective legal and justice system as a necessary pan of proposed com-
prehensive development framework), at http:/www.worldbank.org/cdf/cdf.pdf.
40. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Develop-
ment Assistance Committee, On Common Ground: Converging Views on Devel-
opment and Development Co-operation at the Turn of the Centuriy (Feb. 2000)
(surveying basic international principles of development and sustainable develop-
ment), at http://www.vworldbank.org/cdf/oncommonground.htm.
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and financial issues on the one hand, with structural, social and hu1-
man issues, on the other, in a balanced way, thereby integrating the
following key elements: ... good governance and public manage-
ment, democratic accountability, the protection of human rights and
the rule of law."'"
Similarly, the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development
and Programme of Action, adopted by states at the World Summit
for Social Development, provides that sustainable and equitable de-
velopment must include democracy, social justice. economic devel-
opment, environmental protection, transparent and accountable gov-
ernance, and universal respect for, and observance of, all human
rights.42
The most comprehensive statement of what the Bank considers its
role to be in promoting human rights is found in the 1998 Bank pub-
lication entitled, Development and Human Rights: The Role of the
World Bank.43 Therein, the Bank states its belief that creating the
conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and irre-
ducible goal of development, 44 that sustainable development is "im-
possible" without human rights45 and that it is the manner in which
economic reform lending programs are implemented that is crucial to
secure the needs of the poor.46 Additionally, the Bank holds that pov-
erty spreads deeper when the poor are subject to inequalities that dis-
41. Id.
42. See Report of the World Summit for Social Development, U.N. World
Summit for Social Development, para. 26, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.166/9 (1995)
(English version) (stating that the principles and goals of social development are to
be based on dignity, human rights, equality, respect, peace. democracy, mutual re-
sponsibility and cooperation, and full respect for religious, ethical and cultural val-
ues of people).
43. Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank, (The Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank 1998)
[hereinafter Development and Human Rights], available (it
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/rights/hrtext.pdf.
44. See id. at 2 (observing that the advancement of human rights is impossible
without development and that the world accepts this proposition).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 8 (claiming that it is not economic reform lending that should
raise concerns about human rights, but rather, it is how those programs are imple-
mented, and what measures are taken to ensure that the needs of the poor are not
neglected).
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able them from accessing the tools needed for economic growth."
Furthermore, the Bank believes that human rights cannot be guaran-
teed without a strong, accessible and independent judiciary." The
Bank also contends that property is the ultimate potential asset of
every poor person.49
These statements clearly show, in principle, the Bank's accep-
tance, albeit through the lens of poverty reduction, of human rights
as fundamental to development and that the Bank does have a role to
play in promoting, and through its good governance programs, en-
forcing human rights. Property rights, participation rights, special
measures for excluded persons and groups, and judicial guarantees
are all identified as fundamental to poverty reduction, the primary
goal of the Bank. 0 Nevertheless, even though these recent statements
are a marked improvement over the previous position of the Bank,
they do not address the more fundamental issue of whether the Bank
has an obligation to respect, promote, and protect human rights.
47. See Development and Human Rights, supra note 43, at 14 (stating that a
feature of poverty is the dramatic inequalities in access to the prerequisites of eco-
nomic growth: education, health care, credit and basic financial services, land, and
knowledge). These disparities signal problems of more profound distortions, mani-
fested in the exclusion from public services of women, ethnic, religious, and racial
minorities, and geographically isolated communities. Id. This social exclusion can
lead to social instability and, all too often, to violence. Id.
48. See id. at 15 (asserting that the Bank recognizes the importance of open and
efficient courts to sustained and widely enforced economic growth).
49. See id. at 18 (maintaining that property is the foundation upon which citi-
zens participate in community and political life and that when poor people own
property in a secure and recognized fashion, they are more likely to attend school,
seek medical care, invest in land, protect the environment, and build social har-
mony). The main problem in developing countries is that property claims by the
poor, while acknowledged within the community, are often not recognized by the
state. See id.
50. See The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Articles ofAgreement, art. I (effective Feb. 16. 1989) [hereinafter IBRD, Ar-
ticles of Agreement] (setting forth the purposes of the Bank), at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/backgrdlibrdlarttoc.htni.
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II. DOES THE BANK HAVE A LEGAL OBLIGATION
TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS?
This broader issue-whether the Bank has legal, as opposed to
moral, obligations to respect human rights-turns largely on the legal
interpretation given to the Bank's Articles of Agreement,"' its Rela-
tionship Agreement with the United Nations,5" an examination of the
status or position of the Bank in the international legal system, and
whether a duty to account for and respect human rights attaches to
such status. In other words, do the Bank's Articles of Agreement
prohibit or limit the Bank from addressing and accounting for the
human rights of indigenous peoples and others? Furthermore, is the
Bank a subject of international law with rights and duties arising
thereby and, if so, what is the nature and extent of those duties as
they apply to human rights?
A. THE BANK'S MANDATE AND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
The Bank's primary justification for not directly addressing the
full range of international human rights in its policies and operations
is the Bank's limited mandate, as defined by its Articles of Agree-
ment.5 3 This is perhaps best expressed by the former General Counsel
of the Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, who stated:
There is the need to honor the charter of each organization and to respect
the specialization of different international organizations as reflected in
the statutory requirements of their respective charters. Such is the case, in
particular, with the charters of specialized U.N. agencies, such as the
World Bank, which delimit the mandate of each organization;
54
and,
For any international financial institution, such as the World Bank, the
51. See IBRD, Articles of Agreement, supra note 50 (articulating the World
Bank's Articles of Agreement).
52. See discussion infra Parts II.B.2. (discussing the World Bank's Relation-
ship Agreement with the United Nations).
53. See IBRD, Articles ofAgreemnent, supra note 50, art. IV, sec. 10 (discussing
the political activity that is prohibited by the Bank).
54. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Democracy and Development, 46 INT'L & COMPi. L.Q.
635, 638 (1997).
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question becomes, not whether human rights are relevant to development,
but whether the mandate of any institution, as defined and limited by its
Articles of Agreement, can cover the promotion and protection of all hu-
man rights, or is limited to the rights which have an economic or social
character as opposed to a political character.
55
In essence, Shihata maintains that a textual and "teleological" in-
terpretation of the language of the Articles precludes the Bank's at-
tention to a broad range of human rights issues.: Specifically, he is
referring to the prohibition of interference in the "political affairs" of
Bank members and the requirement that only "economic considera-
tions" are of relevance to the Bank's decision-making processes and
operational activities (respectively, Article IV, section 10" and Arti-
cle III, section 5(b)).58 Pursuant to this, the Bank maintains that it is
only authorized to deal with the economic aspects of development
and is compelled to leave aside issues that may be defined as politi-
cal.59 In Shihata's opinion, the political prohibition even extends to
preventing the Bank's Executive Directors from raising a state's hu-
man rights record when debating a loan proposal.'
55. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Hunman Rights. Development. and International Fi-
nancial Institutions, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27, 28 (1992).
56. See id. at 31 (concluding that the World Bank's mandate should enable the
organization to aid member countries and to improve the economic standards of
their peoples). See generally TETSUO SATO, EVOLVING CONSTITU-TIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1996) (discussing extensively the complexities
of interpreting the constitutions of international organizations).
57. See IBRD, Articles of Agreement, supra note 50, art. IV, sec. 10 ("IThe
Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor
shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member
or members concerned.").
58. See id. art. III, sec. 5(b) ("The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that
the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was
granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and with-
out regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations.").
59. See IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 78
(1991) (promoting that the Bank and its officers are required not to interfere in the
political affairs of its members and to take only economic considerations into ac-
count).
60. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis
of the Legal Issues and the Record ofAchievements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
39, 46-47 (1988) (articulating that only economic considerations, weighed impar-
tially, are relevant to the Bank's decisions).
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It is important to note here that the Bank's Articles do not define
the terms "economic considerations," "political affairs," or "political
character."'6' Subject to certain limitations, primarily those set forth
in international treaty law, the Bank's Board of Executive Directors
has ultimate authority to interpret the Articles and is free to interpret
the meaning of these terms.62 This open interpretation allows the
Bank's Board to determine what is within its jurisdictional sphere
and the Bank has done so numerous times in the past.63 Issues ad-
dressed by the Bank's Board include several previously defined as
political and excluded by the Articles including corruption and good
governance.64 I will return to each of these issues in greater detail
below. In the meantime, it is important to understand the import of
and problems with Shihata's position and reasoning.
1. Position of the Bank's Articles in International Law
Shihata's prioritization of the Bank's Articles places them above
all other obligations the Bank and its Members may have as mem-
bers of the United Nations system 65 and as subjects of international
law, and implies that any action taken pursuant to the Articles is le-
gitimate, irrespective of the prescriptions set forth in international
law generally and international human rights law specifically. 66 As a
recent U.N. study concludes, the effect is to turn the international le-
gal order on its head:
61. See generally IBRD, Articles ofAgreenent, supra note 50 (failing to define
these key terms and concepts).
62. See Shihata, supra note 55, at 29-30 (stating that by expanding the scope
and types of lending in order to adopt to the changing needs of its borrowing
members, the World Bank has continuously developed its functions).
63. See id. (explaining the significance of the expanded interpretation ofjuris-
diction).
64. See IBRD, Articles ofAgreement supra note 50, art. IV, sec. 10 (discussing
the Bank's prohibited political activity).
65. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 1, para. 30 (stating that honoring the
charter of the World Bank is placed above any international obligations that the
Bank may have).
66. See id. (deducing that the Bank's Articles are placed above all other Bank
obligations).
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The principal problem with the "'honoring the charter" or "privileging the
Articles" approach to the issue is that it subordinates the international
human rights instruments to the charters of the agencies in question when,
as a matter of law, the reverse should be the case. Human rights obliga-
tions emanate from the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal
Declaration, and have come to represent a standard that in over 50 years
of existence signifies a holistic approach to the human condition.67
The Bank does not operate in a legal vacuum. It operates within
the international legal system and both the Bank and its constituent
agreement are governed by international law,6" as neither the Bank
nor its Articles are above the law.69 The International Court of Justice
("IC'") also confirmed that an interpretation and application of an
international instrument must be made within the framework of the
prevailing legal system at the time of its interpretation.70 Addition-
ally, Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties provides that treaty interpretation shall take into account "any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
67. Id. para. 33.
68. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 671 (2d
ed., Williams Clowes 1973) (explaining that political conditions, functional re-
quirements, and historical development have created a decentralized system). See
also C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 3
(1962) (maintaining that if a body has the character of an international body, the
law governing its life must be international in character); HENRY G. SCHERMERS &
NEILS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN
DIVERSIY 822 (3d ed. 1995); SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 76-79 (articulating that
international organizations are subjects of international law and actors with an in-
ternational legal personality and therefore international law creates the framework
within which the organizations have to work).
69. See William S. Hein, Interpretation of the Agreement of the 25 March 1951
Between The WHO and Egypt, in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: REPORTS OF
JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS 89-90 (1980) (reporting that inter-
national organizations are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under
general rules of international law).
70. See William S. Hein, Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South Vest Africa) Notwithstanling Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), i, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: REPORTS
OF JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS 31 (1971) (concluding that an
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of
the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation, and its interpre-
tation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, through the
Charter of the United Nations, and by way of customary law).
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the parties."' 7' Therefore, as a general proposition, the Bank is subject
to international law and its Articles must be interpreted consistently
with international legal principles, particularly those of a higher or-
der, including human rights norms.72
At its fifty-third session in 2001, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights made this point when
discussing the International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") contention
that its Articles do not require the IMF to respect human rights in its
operations and policies: 73
Several Subcommission Experts, including Fisseha Yimer, Yozo Yakota,
Asbjorn Eide, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, said they were surprised to hear
the IMF state bluntly that the Fund was not bound by international human
rights instruments and standards. Mr. Yokota added that while the rela-
tionship between trade and financial regimes and human rights regimes
was a vital issue, those regimes should not be compared on an equal
footing-human rights regimes were superior and could not be ignored
even by agreements between States, or in the operations of international
financial institutions.
74
71. International Law Commission, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(3)(c), available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
72. See Gunther Handl, The Legal Mandate of Multilateral Development Banks
as Agents for Change Toward Sustainable Development, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 642,
654-55 (1998) (discussing the impact of the law on sustainable development on
interpretation of the political prohibition in the Bank's Articles). Flandl persua-
sively argues that:
[T]he "political activity" clause in [Multilateral Developmenmt Banks'] con-
stituent instruments represents a concept that is essentially open-ended or
evolutionary by definition: the interpretation of such a concept, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice observed in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, cannot
remain unaffected by the subsequent development of the law. As a matter of
fact, its interpretation at any given time must reflect the coming into existence
of sustainable-development-related international legal parameters applicable
to states' economic development activities.
ld. at 657.
73. See SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 74-75 (discussing the absence of the politi-
cal prohibition found in the Articles of the International Monetary Fund and corn-
paring this significance).
74. World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund Respond to Suib-
commission Report on Globalization. U.N. Doc. HR/SC/0 1/I 1 (Aug. 8, 2001).
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The relationship between the Bank's Articles and the rights and
duties set forth in the Charter of the United Nations is clear. Both the
Bank and its members have obligations under the Charter that super-
cede the provisions of the Articles." One of the primary purposes of
the United Nations Charter is to promote and encourage respect for
human rights.76 Therefore, the U.N. Charter's provisions on human
rights are directly relevant to the larger issue of the Bank's responsi-
bility towards human rights.
2. The Prohibition of Political Intetference
As noted above, the prevailing interpretation within the Bank of its
Articles leads to a classification of human rights issues as either eco-
nomic or political. Those that can be classified as economic, social,
or cultural rights are legitimate and cognizable, while those classified
as political rights are beyond the jurisdiction of the Bank. 7 For this
reason, the Bank often highlights what it perceives to be its contribu-
tion to furthering economic, social, and cultural human rights
through poverty alleviation, while disregarding the majority of civil
and political rights."
75. See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (providing that in the event of a conflict be-
tween the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present
Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obliga-
tions under the present Charter prevail); see also SHIHATA, supra note 59, at 76
(contending that members obligations under the United Nations Charter prevail
over their treaty obligations under the Bank's Articles of Agreement, by means of
an explicit provision of the United Nations Charter).
76. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (declaring that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion).
77. See SHIHATA, supra note 59, at 75 (promoting that the Bank and its officers
are required not to interfere in the political affairs of its members and to take only
economic considerations into account); see also Development and luman Rights,
supra note 43, at 3 (maintaining that the Bank's Articles of Agreement state that in
all its decisions, only economic considerations are relevant).
78. See generally Development and Human Rights, supra note 43 (discussing
the restriction placed on the Bank through its articles from confronting the issue of
human rights). Discussing this requirement, the Bank states that:
Some believe that this restriction prevents the Bank from adequately con-
fronting the issue of human rights. And to be sure, some aspects of human
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Apart from contradicting the accepted position that all human
rights are indivisible and interdependent, a position accepted by the
Bank itself, this classificatory scheme is justly characterized as am-
biguous, ad hoc, arbitrary, and at times self-serving insofar as it ap-
pears that the Bank readily justifies reinterpreting its mandate to
cover areas that it wishes to operate, while arguing that it is prohib-
ited by its Articles from those areas it wishes to avoid.79 With regard
to corruption, for instance, President Wolfensohn frankly states that
the Bank decided "to redefine the word corruption, regarding it as an
economic, rather than a political matter."80 The Bank's position also
belies the fact that almost all human rights have economic implica-
tions and most economic issues involve a series of political calcula-
tions and considerations.8
Shihata defines issues related to "the art and practice of running a
country or governing," as "political," but he excludes "such typical
economic and technical issues as the 'management of money or the
finances' or more generally the efficient management of the coun-
tries' resources."82 The Bank's 'good governance programs and crite-
rights do fall outside its mandate. But the Bank's economic and social ap-
proach to development advances a comprehensive, interconnected vision of
human rights that is too often overlooked. There is also practical, operational
value in the way the Articles are drafted. Because lending decisions are based
on the quality of the project, and the effectiveness of the programs in reducing
poverty, the Bank has been able to escape the costly experience of committing
scarce funds based on short-term political or ideological considerations,
which have little to do with relieving the burden of poverty. For the World
Bank, protecting and advancing human rights means helping the world's
poorest people escape poverty.
Id. at 3.
79. See SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 74 (concluding that it is plausible to argue
that unless something is specifically prohibited by the Articles of Agreement, and
the carrying out of a specific program or policies can be reasonably deemed to as-
sist in the fulfillment of the Bank's purposes, it would be seen as legitimate).
80. Thomas Fuster, The World Bank's Fear of the Word "Politics " Walking a
Fine Line in the Call for "Good Governance ", NEUE ZURCHER ZEITUNG, Sept. 18,
1999, at http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/background1999/backgrou...
/bg990918worldbank.htm.
81. See SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 98 (explaining that the Bank accepted that
political considerations may be made if they influence economic performance and
thus a link can be made between the economic position of a country and respect for
human rights).
82. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Opinion on Governance (unpublished), quoted
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ria provide more information about the scope of the latter aspect and
include attention to "the manner in which power is exercised in the
management of a country's economic and social resources for devel-
opment. ' 83 This includes accountability,"4 transparency,"5 and the rule
of law.16 Shihata's legal opinions have undoubtedly influenced the
practice and understanding of the Bank." However, other sources are
equally, if not more relevant to understanding what is meant by the
term "political affairs."
First, in international treaty law, if the use of a term in a treaty is
unclear, one may make reference to materials supplementary to the
text in order to ascertain the intent of the drafters.88 The record of the
in Bradlow, supra note 15, at 54 n. 35. 60-1 nn. 60-2.
83. See THE WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPIM-NT 3 (1992) (re-
porting that the Bank's interest in governance stems from its concern for the effec-
tiveness of the development it supports and that a more relevant definition for
Bank purposes is "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a
country's economic and social resources for development").
84. See id. at 13-28 (defining accountability as countering corruption by hold-
ing public officials responsible for their actions).
85. See id. at 31 (defining transparency as a means of preventing corruption
through keeping information public).
86. See id. at 28-39 (holding that the Rule of Law is the aspect most important
to economic development, and therefore to Bank assistance).
87. Shihata was Vice President and General Counsel to the Bank for 15 years.
As the following quote indicates. Shihata's legal opinions may have been coloured
by his own political beliefs. Addressing a Select Committee of the Canadian House
of Commons in 1995, Shihata stated that "while it was critical to address corrup-
tion and other 'good governance' challenges. this meant 'walking a tight rope'
between applying policy pressures that could be justified on economic grounds and
crossing over the line into unacceptable political interference." See HOUSE OF
COMMONS CANADA, Chapter Four- Reforming the IFIS' Policv Frameworks: Ac-
centuating Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Human Development, FROM
BRETTON WOODS TO HALIFAX AND BEYOND: TOWARDS A 21ST SUMMIT FOR THE
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE, at http:// www.g7.utoronto.cai g7/ governmen-
tal/hc25/hc25_c46.htm. While referring to a recent European Parliament resolution
to change the Bank's articles of agreement to include democratic and human rights
criteria (similar to the EBRD's constitution), Shihata's preference was to "'support
such objectives more indirectly in the context of continued economic liberaliza-
tion." Id.
88. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfir signature May
23, 1969, art. 31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S 301 (providing that if parties cannot ascertain
the meaning of a treaty term from the ordinary meaning given to the term in the
context of the purpose of the treaty, parties may look to preparatory work of the
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Bretton Woods Conference is therefore relevant to understanding the
meaning of this term. Bradlow notes that the record of the Confer-
ence indicates that participants of the Conference enacted the politi-
cal prohibition to ensure that the Bank conducts its decision-making
processes and operations impartially, without reference to the politi-
cal character of the state or states involved.89 This is a far cry from
the wholesale rejection of many human rights expressed by the Bank.
Significantly, the U.N.'s legal counsel arrived at a similar concliu-
sion during the controversy over the Bank's refusal to comply with
calls from the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, and reiterated in
1967 and 1968, that the Bank refused loans to South Africa and
Portugal.9" Responding to the Bank's argument that the political pro-
hibition in its Articles preclude loan refusal for any non-economic
reasons, the U.N.'s legal counsel, S.A. Bleicher, opines that the Bank
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion to determine the meaning of the
term); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, opened for signature 21
March 1986, art. 31-32, 25 I.L.M. 543 (reiterating the above provisions of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 01
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 626-32 (4th ed. 1990) (summarizing Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
89. See Bradlow, supra note 15, at 90 n.35 (asserting that statements made at
the Bretton Woods Conference make it apparent that the political prohibition's
purpose was to guarantee the Bank's impartiality); see also James C.N. Paul. In-
ternational Development Agencies, Human Rights and Human Development Proj-
ects, 17 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67 (1988) (citing EDWARD MASON &
ROBERT ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 27-28 (1973)) ("The
clause, which is now Article IV(10), was drafted to assure the USSR and other so-
cialist states (e.g., Yugoslavia) that the Bank would not meddle with their political
systems.").
90. See The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South
Africa, G.A. Res. 2054, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1966) (recommending that economic sanctions be applied against South
Africa due to its government's continuation of its apartheid policies); inplementa-
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 2105, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 4, U.N. Doe.
A/6014 (1965) (requesting that all international institutions withhold assistance
from the governments of Portugal and South Africa until they reverse their policies
of racial discrimination and colonial domination); see also SCIIERMFERS &
BLOKKER, supra note 68, at 1073-75 (explaining that the General Assembly re-
quested that the Bank withhold assistance of any kind from Portugal and South Af-
rica until their governments reversed their policies of colonial domination and ra-
cial discrimination).
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was reading this requirement too broadly." As the record of a meet-
ing indicates:
The first sentence of Section 10 appears to have as its purpose the prohi-
bition of interference in the internal political affairs of a Member State
and of discrimination against a State because of the political character of
its government. He doubted very much that the sentence is intended to
relate to criteria involving the international conduct of a State affecting its
fundamental Charter obligations.
-9 2
Later Bleicher wrote: "The policy goals underlying article IV, sec-
tion 10, should not be construed as making no distinction between
'political affairs' and violation of the basic legal norms of the inter-
national system. '93 Much of the corpus of human rights law is gener-
ally considered part of the basic legal norms of the international sys-
tem.
Second, the U.N. Charter has a similar provision prohibiting inter-
ference in internal political affairs.' However, it is standard and ac-
cepted practice within the U.N. that this provision does not apply to
human rights because they are deemed to be of international concern
and not solely within the internal sovereign or political sphere of
states.95 One conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the politi-
91. See Samuel A. Bleicher, U.N. v. IBRD: .4 Dilemnna of Functionalism, 24
INT'L ORG. 31, 31 (discussing the refusal of the World Bank to deny benefits to
Portugal and South Africa on the ground that it is a nonpolitical organization).
92. Provisional Summary Record of the 1653rd Meeting, [ 19661 at 382-3, U.N.
Doc. A/C.4/SR.1653 (detailing Bleicher's position regarding the application of the
first sentence in section 10).
93. Bleicher, supra note 91, at 47.
94. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 ("[N]othing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essen-
tially within the DOMESTIC jurisdiction of any state...").
95. See BROWNLIE, supra note 68, at 294 (asserting that the U.N. has passed
many resolutions on breaches of human rights and thereby has taken action on re-
lations of governments to their own people): see also UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, para. 4, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (1993) thereinafter VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME]
("[T]he promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms
must be considered as a priority objective of the United Nations in accordance with
its purposes and principles, in particular the purpose of international cooperation.
In the framework of these purposes and principles, the promotion and protection of
all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community.").
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cal prohibition cannot be interpreted as encompassing human rights
because the international law understanding of the term "political af-
fairs" does not include human rights and, thus, the Bank's Articles
must be interpreted accordingly. 6
Third, as part of the exercise of their sovereign will, the vast ma-
jority of the Bank's Members have voluntarily committed themselves
to abide by human rights standards through ratification of interna-
tional conventions, through the formation of international customary
human rights norms and, in some cases, by assenting to U.N. and
other declarations.97 In doing so, the Bank's members have accepted
international obligations to promote, respect, protect, and fulfill hu-
man rights and, in many cases, international oversight of their com-
pliance with these obligations. It is therefore extremely problematic,
and contrary to accepted international practice, to characterize hu-
man rights as solely internal, political considerations, or, as the Bank
often does, to characterize raising human rights issues as a violation
of state sovereignty." As Judge Weeramantry of the ICJ observes:
[T]he concept of human rights has long passed the stage when it was a
narrow parochial concern between sovereign and subject. We have
reached the stage, today, at which the human rights of anyone, anywhere,
are the concern of everyone, everywhere. The world's most powerful
States are bound to recognize them, equally with the weakest, and there is
not even the semblance of a suggestion in contemporary international law
that such obligations amount to a derogation of sovereignty. 99
96. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (June 1971) ("[A]n international instrument has to be inter-
preted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the
time of the interpretation.").
97. One hundred and forty-four of the Bank's one hundred and eighty-one
members ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while
one hundred and forty-two ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and one hundred and seventy-nine ratified the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.
98. It is nonetheless true that human rights instruments generally leave it up to
the ratifying state to determine the means by which it will give effect to the rights
set forth therein. This does not however remove the obligation to recognize, re-
spect, enforce, and provide adequate and effective remedies for violations of hu-
man rights.
99. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
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Integration of human rights issues into Bank policy-making and
operational activities would, in the majority of cases, merely restate
aims, objectives, and obligations already subscribed to by the vast
majority of its members. A significant number of Bank members
have monist legal systems under which these international obliga-
tions are an integral part of their domestic law; dualist states have in-
corporated, or are required to incorporate, these international obliga-
tions into domestic law. 100 Moreover, as discussed below, the Bank
has obligations under international law not to undermine its mem-
bers' ability to faithfully comply with, nor to facilitate violation by
its members of, their international obligations, including those per-
taining to human rights.01
Finally, it is relevant in this context to note that the Bank's Opera-
tional Policy 4.01 on Environmental Assessment clearly states that
"the Bank takes into account... the obligations of the country, per-
taining to project activities, under relevant international environ-
mental treaties and agreements. The Bank does not finance project
activities that would contravene such country obligations, as identi-
fied during the EA."' 0 2 The Bank's Operational Policy 4.36 on For-
gro)), § 2, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjvwwf/idocket/ibhy/ibhyfr-me.htm (July 11,
1996).
100. See International Covenant On Civil and Political Rights, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2(2) (stating that "where not already provided for by ex-
isting legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance vith its constitutional processes
and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other meas-
ures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant."), at http://vww.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr (Nov. 16, 2001).
101. See infra notes 137-150 and accompanying text (explaining the Bank's ob-
ligations under international law regarding human rights).
102. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL POLICY 4.01,
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, para. 3 (1999) [hereinafter OP 4.01]. See generally
Mohammed Abdelwahab Bekhechi, Some Observations Regarding Environmental
Covenants and Conditionalities in World Bank Lending Activities, in 3 MAX
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 290 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rudiger
Wolfrum, eds., 1999) (explaining that the Bank started evaluating environmental
issues of its projects in the 1970s); IBRAH-IM SHIHATA, II ThE WORLD BANK IN A
CHANGING WORLD 183-236 (1995) (evaluating the Bank's legal instruments for
achieving environmental goals); Charles E. Di Leva, International Environmental
Law and Development, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 501, 501 (discussing that
the Bank can have an impact in its donor countries by attaching environment-
related conditions on its loans); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Implementation. Enforce-
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estry ("OP 4.36") also states that "the Bank does not finance projects
that contravene applicable international environmental agree-
ments."' 10 3 If this is possible with regard to environmental obliga-
tions, is there a compelling reason why human rights obligations
should not be accorded equal status?"°4 The Bank's Senior Counsel
agrees insofar as he states that the Bank must account for its Mem-
bers' treaty obligations in general. He states:
Because governments are the owners of the institutions like the World
Bank, and are bound to comply with the treaties they have ratified, multi-
lateral financial institutions must be careful to ensure that if these treaties
are implicated in their projects, the treaties are appropriately taken into
account in project design and finance."15
3. Only Economic Considerations
According to Shihata, the language "only economic considera-
tions," which is the other side of the political-economic dichotomy
found in the Bank's Articles, refers to only those issues that in the
Bank's judgment have a "direct and obvious economic effect rele-
vant to the [Bank's] work"' 6 and dictates that the Bank focus exclu-
sively on economic factors in its decision making unless non-
economic issues exist in "such proportions as to become a Bank con-
inent, and Compliance wvith International Environmental Agreements Practical
suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. RFv.
37, 49 (explaining that the Bank has numerous mechanisms for ensuring donor
countries' compliance with international environmental agreements, including the
requirement of environmental impact assessment reports on projects considered for
financing and the Bank's refraining from financing any projects that contradict the
borrowing country's obligations under international environmental agreements).
103. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL POLICY 4.36,
FORESTRY, para. 2 (1993).
104. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, NGOs Urge Implementation of
Wolfensohn Commitment to Human Rights (Sept. 22, 2000) (noting Bank Presi-
dent, James Wolfensohn's, commitment to "making explicit reference to human
rights in Bank documents," and "to work with Bank staff to include human rights
in their policy documents.), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/O9/prague.htm.
105. Di Leva, supra note 102, at 501-2.
106. Bradlow, supra note 15, at 60 n.58 (quoting SHIHATA, supra note 102, at
53-97).
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cern, either due to significant direct economic effects" 0 or because
the non-economic issues result in "international obligations relevant
to the Bank." ' 8 Professor Paul, however, argues that "the clause was
intended to enjoin use of 'non-economic' (e.g., ideological) criteria
as grounds to determine eligibility for Bank membership or for loans,
and presumably, it commands that Bank loans must be confined to
the promotion of 'economic development.," 10
Further, Bradlow cogently argues that since the Bank implements
projects over a relatively long time frame, "it is likely that within
such a time frame almost all political, social and cultural issues will
have a direct and obvious effect."'"0 To illustrate, Bradlow states:
Consider a Bank Member State that decides on human rights grounds to
grant all criminal defendants the fight to counsel and a fair trial. This de-
cision would appear to be a political decision that is not relevant to Bank
decision-making. However, this decision, over time, can have significant
and potentially contradictory economic effects. On the one hand, the re-
sulting improvement in the Member State's human rights situation could
lead to an improvement in business confidence, which could result in in-
creased investment, increased employment, and reduced social tensions.
On the other hand, the decision could lead to a reallocation of resources
towards the criminal justice system, which could result in a reduction of
resources available to the civil justice system. The need for police officers
to spend more time in court testifying in criminal trials could lead to a re-
duction in the number of police officers available to prevent crime. In ad-
dition, the decision could lead to a budgeting reallocation to the criminal
justice system with adverse consequences for other areas of the budget.
These developments could adversely affect business confidence leading to
a reduction in investment, a rise in unemployment and social tensions,
and a decline in the Borrower State's ability to perform its loan obliga-
tions. In either case, it is clear that the decision will have direct economic
consequences.
t 11
107. Shihata, supra note 55, at 32; see also SHIHATA, supra note 102, at 575
(stating that a violation of individual political rights could become an issue in the
Bank's decisions).
108. Id.
109. Paul, supra note 89, at 118-19.
110. Bradlow, supra note 15, at 62. See generally Daniel D. Bradlow & Claudio
Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the
World Bank and IMF, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 411 (explaining the challenges interna-
tional financial institutions face in the current era of states facing complex issues).
11. Bradlow, supra note 15, at 62.
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4. Indigenous Peoples' Rights and the Political-Economic Test
Applying the political-economic test to indigenous peoples' rights
poses even greater difficulties. These rights are often fundamentally
related to and intertwined with ownership and control of land, which
is widely accepted as the basis of indigenous political, social, spiri-
tual, and cultural organization. These rights are also
intergenerational, often involving rights and duties held of and owed
to previous and future generations. A U.N. study on indigenous land
rights, for instance, has found:
(i) a profound relationship exists between indigenous peoples and their
lands, territories and resources; (ii) this relationship has various social,
cultural, spiritual, economic and political dimensions and responsibilities,
(iii) the collective dimension of this relationship is significant; and (iv)
the intergenerational aspect of such a relationship is also crucial to in-
digenous peoples' identity, survival and cultural viability. There may be
additional elements relating to indigenous peoples and their relationship
to their lands, territories and resources which have not been captured by
these examples.' 12
How does the Bank, in funding a project that affects indigenous
peoples' land rights, separate out the economic, political, cultural,
religious, and social aspects of those rights in order to determine
what activities are within its jurisdictional competence? Rights to
autonomy and self-government are predicated upon having a defined
and recognized land base. Indigenous legal systems are fundamen-
tally related to land and resource management and social cohesion.
Security of tenure is fundamental to economic security and develop-
ment opportunities as well as cultural survival. Indigenous economic
activities, which are normally central to cultural identity, are in most
cases based upon detailed knowledge and use of specific lands and
waters. The latter clearly meets the Bank's jurisdictional test, the
former not, yet they are each inseparably associated with indigenous
territorial rights.
112. Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land: Final Working Paper
Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, U.N. ECOSOC 4th
Comm., 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 5, para. 20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (2001).
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The same may also be said for the prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation, a fundamental component of indigenous rights. This prohibi-
tion exists both independently and in connection with other rights.
The prohibition of racial discrimination in connection with indige-
nous land and resource rights is of particular relevance. Clearly, dis-
crimination has both political and economic facets that are interde-
pendent and Bank publications have recognized the economic costs
of discrimination against indigenous peoples as have others."' De-
spite this recognition, the Bank refuses to treat indigenous land rights
as a cognizable issue; instead, considering the issue part of the inter-
nal political realm of states." 4
How does the Bank extricate those elements of indigenous cultural
rights applying to economic matters from those applying to non-
economic matters, when the authoritative interpreters of that culture,
indigenous peoples themselves, would find such a distinction non-
sensical and impossible to apply in practice? How does the Bank ad-
dress indigenous people who view the land as the seat of their eco-
nomic and physical well-being as well as the material incarnation of
an ancestor and therefore, a relative? How does one separate the right
to freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development from the
right to freely determine political status, when each are dependent on
the other? These considerations apply both to Bank operations and to
the nature of safeguards provided by Bank Operational Policies, es-
pecially OP 4.10 on Indigenous peoples, but also the OPs on For-
estry, Environmental and Social Assessment, Habitat protection, etc.
113. See Harry Anthony Patrinos, The Costs of Discrimination in Latin America,
in HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS POLICY WORKING PAPERS,
WORLD BANK I (discussing that indigenous, ethnic, racial and linguistic minorities
are in an inferior social and economic position as compared to the mainstream
population), at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/hnpfhddflash/workp/
wp_00045.htm; INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND POVERTY IN LATIN AMERICA: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (George Psacharopoulous & Harry Anthony Patrinos eds.,
1994) (examining the extent of poverty among indigenous as compared to non-
indigenous populations across Latin America and providing policy recommenda-
tions to alleviate that situation).
114. See discussion infra Part II.B.I.
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5. Conclusion
This section illustrates that Bank attention to human rights issues
is partly a matter of the interpretation given to the language of its
Articles of Agreement. The argument of the Bank, in particular its
former General Counsel, is that the language of the Articles pre-
cludes Bank engagement with many human rights issues and places
the Articles at the pinnacle of the legal order applying to the Bank.III
This position is sanctioned by the Bank's Board of Executive Direc-
tors, which has ultimate authority to interpret the Articles."' The
Bank also maintains that, while it may not address all human rights,
it does substantially contribute to the realization of economic, social,
and cultural rights and, indirectly through its governance programs,
to the realization of civil and political rights." 7 It should be noted
here again that the Bank has never engaged in an analysis of whether
it has any legal obligations with regard to human rights, but rather
only whether, under its Articles and as a matter of discretion, it ,nav
or should promote or condition operations on human rights consid-
erations and, if so, which.
The counter argument, which I believe to be correct, states that the
Bank's Articles are not immune from the prescriptions of interna-
tional law, human rights law in particular, and therefore cannot rule
out attention to the full range of human rights. It also questions the
prevailing interpretation of the political prohibition in the Articles
and proposes alternative, and in light of contemporary international
practice, more appropriate, interpretations." 8 The economic-political
115. See Shihata, supra note 55, at 35 (stating that the World Bank's Articles of'
Agreement "cannot be appropriately interpreted to allow the World Bank to use its
lending power as an instrument for ensuring respect for political human rights.")
116. See IBRD, Articles of Agreement, supra note 50, art. V, sec. 4 (discussing
the authority of the Executive Directors).
117. See Shihata, supra note 55, at 28 ("[t]he question becomes not whether
human rights are relevant to development, but whether the mandate of any institu-
tion, as defined and limited by its Articles of Agreement, can cover the promotion
and protection of all human rights, or is limited to the rights which have an eco-
nomic or social character as opposed to a political character.").
118. In this context, a series of U.N. General Assembly resolutions on the right
to development have contained the following language:
Recalling that, in order to promote development, equal attention and urgent
consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protec-
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dichotomy is presented as lacking any basis in fact that is both arbi-
trary and inconsistently applied. In the case of indigenous peoples'
rights it presents substantial difficulties. Both as an international le-
gal entity and as a forum for collective action by its members, the
Bank has certain defined duties concerning human rights that cannot
be ignored. At a minimum, Bank policies and practices must account
for and respect human rights standards and the Bank should re-
quire-as does its policy on Environmental Assessment-that it will
not finance projects that contravene its Members' international obli-
gations.119
B. THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE BANK TO RESPECT HUMAN
RIGHTS
This section of the article looks at whether the Bank has a legal
obligation to account for and respect human rights. This obligation
may derive from a number of sources. Two of these sources, the du-
ties incumbent upon subjects of international law and the obligations
pertaining to specialized agencies of the United Nations, will be ex-
amined in this section. 2 The Member States of the Bank have clear
tion of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and recognizing
that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated
and that the universality, objectivity, impartiality and non-selectivity of the
consideration of human rights issues must be ensured-
and,
Recognizes that the Declaration on the Right to Development constitutes an
integral link between the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vi-
enna Declaration and Programme of Action through its elaboration of a holis-
tic vision integrating economic, social and cultural rights with civil and politi-
cal rights.
The Right to Development, G.A. Res. 155, U.N. GAOR. 53d Sess.. Agenda Item
110(b), at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/155 (1999); The Right to Development, G.A.
Res. 136, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess.. Agenda Item 112(b), at 2, 4, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/136 (1998).
119. See OP 4.01, supra note 102, at 3 (stating that the Bank will not fund proj-
ects that would conflict with a country's existing obligation).
120. See Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International Institutions
as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples, in
THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE
323, 325 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon, eds., 1999) (stating that with
regard to the possible existence of an obligation to consult with persons affected by
Bank policies, "such obligations might arise by implication from the Bank's con-
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obligations to respect human rights, derived from a variety of
sources, that also bear upon the overall obligations of the Bank. I will
begin with the obligations of subjects of international law.
1. The Obligations of the Bank as a Subject of International Law
A subject of international law is an entity capable of possessing
international rights and duties, along with the capacity to bring inter-
national claims. 2 1 While not strictly equivalent, this can also be de-
scribed as international legal personality. 22 In the case of interna-
tional organizations, international personality is normally determined
by reference to their constituent instruments, either by virtue of an
explicit statement conferring personality or by implication of their
powers and functions. 23 The latter entails an examination of whether
the attribution of legal personality is an indispensable requirement of
the purposes of the organization and whether the organization was
intended to exercise functions that can be explained only by posses-
sion of international personality. 24 The Bank's Articles do not ex-
plicitly state that it has international personality, however, references
to its purposes, powers, and functions clearly demonstrate that it does
and I have found no disagreement with this by either the Bank or
scholars. 125
stitutive instruments and legal relations with members states, or from the Bank's
own commitments to participation, or under general principles of law applicable to
international organizations, or otherwise from public international law").
121. See BROWNLIE, supra note 88, at 58 (asserting that a subject of the law is
able to have international rights and duties and has the capacity to maintain those
rights by bringing international claims).
122. See id. at 60 (stating that questions of legal personality are connected to
those of subjects of the law).
123. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (describing that in order to determine whether or not the
United Nations has legal personality, it is necessary to consider what characteris-
tics its Charter intended to give it); see also C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF
THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 79 (1996)
("[I]ntemational personality of organizations has evolved, as necessary, rather than
emanated from explicit statements in constitutions.").
124. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 82 (explaining that the International
Court of Justice uses these objective criteria in order to determine the existence of
international legal personality).
125. See SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 63-68 (confirming the inference that the
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As a subject of international law, the Bank has rights and duties,
separate from and in addition to its Member States, defined by inter-
national law. 26 Those rights and duties, however, are not the same as
those possessed by states. The latter possess the totality of rights and
duties recognized by international law, whereas the rights and duties
of the Bank are limited to those related to "its purposes and functions
as specified or implied in its constitutional documents and developed
in practice."'' 27 The Bank's purposes and functions, particularly as
developed in practice, are directed towards poverty alleviation and
economic development, often referred to as sustainable development,
the ultimate aim of which is to improve the dignity and quality of
human life. 12 The essence of human rights is the dignity and well-
being of the human person, individually and collectively. '29 The right
to development is itself a human right comprising economic, social,
and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. 30 Also, the
Bank has an international personality); see also Bradlow, supra note 15, at 63
(stating that the Bank is a subject of international law because it is an international
organization and that therefore it cannot violate customary international law);
Bradlow and Grossman, supra note 110, at 428 (stating that international organi-
zations such as the Bank are subjects of international law and therefore are bound
by its norms); Handl, supra note 72, at 654-55 (reiterating that the rules of interna-
tional law should be binding on international organizations such as the Bank);
Kingsbury, supra note 120, at 324 (stating that the Bank may have legal obliga-
tions of consultation deriving from the Bank's constitutive documents and legal
relations with its member states).
126. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 229 (explaining that whenever an
international organization has international personality, it has functions, rights, and
duties of its own).
127. Louis B. Sohn, The U.N. System as Authoritative Ihterpreter of Its Law, in I
UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 189 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner,
eds., 1995) (citing Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, supra note 123, at 178).
128. See SHIHATA, supra note 102, at 183 (asserting that the World Bank insti-
tutions have a mandate to promote economic development in their member coun-
tries).
129. See VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION, supra note 95, at
1 ("[R]ecognizing and affirming that all human rights derive from the dignity and
worth inherent in the human person.").
130. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N.
GAOR, at 2 (1986) ("[T]he right to development is an inalienable human right by
virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in
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Bank's activities, directly and indirectly, implicate a wide range of
human rights issues. 3' Consequently, the Bank's duties towards hui-
man rights should not be limited or excluded by the scope of its
powers and functions.
a. Sources of Law
The Bank's international legal obligations may be located in a
number of specific sources of law: international conventions, cuIs-
tomary international law, general principles of international law, and
peremptory norms of international law. 32 According to Schermers,
[A]part from those peremptory norms of international law which form
part of the legal order of all international organizations, further rules of
international law are also applicable within international organizations...
[A]s the latter have been established under international law, these rules
of international law apply directly as part of the legal order of the organi-
zation in question obviating the need for transformation.
133
Thus, the Bank is bound by international law with regard to both
its internal and external activities and, with the exception of treaty-
based obligations, these obligations pertain to the Bank without any
affirmative act on its part.
International human rights law is an important part of international
law and is expressed in conventions, customary international law,
peremptory norms, international obligations erga omnes, and general
principles. As a general proposition then, the Bank also has obliga-
tions concerning the international law of human rights with regard to
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized."); see also
The Right to Development: Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to De-
velopment, Dr. Aijun Sengupta, U.N. ESCOR, 4th Comm., 57th Sess., at 3 (2000)
(reiterating that the right to development is an inalienable human right).
131. See SHIHATA supra note 102, at 76 (stating that members of the World
Bank who are also members of the United Nations must comply with United Na-
tions-imposed human rights obligations).
132. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 240-47 (discussing the source of
substantive obligations of international organizations); see also SCHERMVIERS &
BLOKKER, supra note 68, at 822-25 (citing customary international law, the con-
stitution of an international organization, and general principles of international
law as sources of law for international organizations).
133. SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 68, at 822.
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its internal and external activities. The nature and extent of these ob-
ligations depends largely on their source, e.g., treaty, custom, per-
emptory norms. Beginning with treaties, the general rule of interna-
tional law is that treaties fail to bind third parties without their
express consent.1 34 The Bank is not a party to any human rights con-
ventions and therefore is not directly bound.' 35 These instruments,
however, may be relevant to the Bank's obligations: they may restate
or inform the content of binding rules of customary international
law, 36 they set out the obligations of most Bank Members, and they
134. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 34, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 341 (indicating the intent of the agreeing countries that the treaty not
create nonconsensual rights or obligations in third parties without their consent);
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Or-
ganizations or Between International Organizations, supra note 88, art. 34, 25 ILM
at 564 (expressing that the treaty does not create either obligations or rights for
third parties without consent).
135. However, Schermers, Blokker, Handl and others argue that circumstances
exist that permit characterization of multilateral treaties as binding on international
organizations even absent their consent. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note
68, at 984 (arguing that even without its consent, an international organization can
be bound to rules of international law); Handl. supra note 72, at 659-63 (opining
that a treaty concerning issues of great importance to the international community,
with widespread support from that community, may be viewed as one of general
acceptance). Handl, for instance, states that:
A multilateral treaty that addresses fundamental concerns of the international
community at large, and that as such is strongly supported by the vast major-
ity of states, by international organizations and by other transnational ac-
tors.. .may indeed create expectations of general compliance; in short, such a
treaty may come to be seen as reflecting legal standards of general applicabil-
ity. Whatever the shorthand explanatory labels for this extended normative
reach-some refer to the treaty provisions concerned as representing a "law
of higher normativity," others as giving expression to a general principle of
law, still another as being the "product of a community consensus formed
around the normative status of discrete decisions at international fora"-these
treaties convey clear signals regarding the policy content and underpinnings
of authority of the normative concepts involved, as well as the willingness of
the international community to ensure their effectiveness, and as such must be
deemed capable of creating rights and obligations both for third states and for
third organizations, including MDBs.
Id. at 660-1 (footnotes omitted).
136. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 38, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 341 (indicating the treaty's intent to allow for any rule to become
binding upon a third party as a customary rule of international law); Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or
Between International Organizations, supra note 88, art. 38, 25 ILM at 566 (reiter-
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elaborate upon the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter, a
source of obligations for both the Bank and its Members.'37
Unquestionably, international organizations, including the Bank,
must abide by customary international law and general principles of
law. 3 ' The ICJ specifically refers to such obligations in its advisory
opinion to the WHO Agreement Case.'39 According to the European
Court of Justice, the European Community must follow international
law and "comply with the rules of customary international law."'4 "
Morgenstern states that:
There is no reason why rules of international law which are generally rec-
ognized as applicable between States and which are not by their nature
unsuitable for international organizations should not be automatically
binding on the latter. Such a conclusion has been justified on the ground
that States bound by rules of international law should not be able to evade
ating the rule in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that a treaty rule
may become binding on a third party if it becomes a customary rule of interna-
tional law).
137. See infira notes 162-86 and accompanying text (explaining the effect that
these instruments have on the Bank's obligations).
138. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 68, at 824, 988 (stating defini-
tively that international organizations are as much bound to customary law as
states); AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 240 (describing situations in which
customary international law binds international organizations); SKOGLY, supra
note 10, at 84-87 (describing the development of customary international law and
the obligations of many international organizations to abide by these common
rules); Handl, supra note 72, at 654 (describing the statement by the International
Court of Justice that as international organizations are subject to international law,
they are bound by general rules of international law); Henry G. Schermers, The
Legal Bases of hIterlnational Organization Action, in A HANDBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 401, 402 (Ren6-Jean Dupuy ed., 1998) (sug-
gesting that the reason that international organizations are bound by customary in-
ternational law may be that the states that created them were themselves bound by
this law); FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 32 (1986) (arguing that since rules of international law are not by
their nature unsuitable for international organizations, they should be bound by
them).
139. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO
and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-90 (Dec. 20) (expressing the opinion of the ICJ that
international organizations, as subjects of international law, are bound by obliga-
tions under general rules of international law).
140. SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 85 (quoting the European Court of Justice in
Racke GmbH & Co and Hauptzollatn Mainz from June 16, 1998, about respecting
international law).
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them collectively. Alternatively, if international organizations are seen as
legal entities distinct from their members [possessing international per-
sonality], the applicability of the relevant rules can be explained as a nec-
essary implication of legal capacity and activity in the international legal
order.
14t
Also, international organizations are undoubtedly bound by per-
emptory norms of international law orjus cogens"'2 These peremp-
tory norms include the prohibition of racial discrimination, the pro-
hibition of genocide, and the right to self-determination.' 3
Related to peremptory norms is the concept of obligations erga
omnes, first pronounced by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction
Case.'" States owe these obligations "towards the international
community as a whole ... [I]n view of the importance of the rights
141. MORGENSTERN, supra note 138, at 32 (expressing the view that interna-
tional organizations should be automatically bound by customary rules of interna-
tional law).
142. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, arts. 53, 64,
1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, 347 (indicating that a treaty will be considered void if it con-
flicts with a peremptory norm of general international law, arising either before or
after the completed treaty); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between
States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations, su-
pra note 88, arts. 53, 64, 25 ILM at 572, 577 (reiterating the rule in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties that a treaty becomes void if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of international law); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 68, at 701
(indicating that an organization's particular acts in the law may be void if in con-
trast withjus cogens); Schermers, supra note 138, at 401-2 (indicating that inter-
national organizations are bound by peremptory norms of international law, such
as the disallowance of aggression and racial discrimination).
143. See BROWNLIE, supra note 68, at 513 (listing various rules of customary
law that formjus cogens).
144. See The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5) (defining for the first time obligations erga onines as a
state's obligation towards the international community as a whole); East Timor
(Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 89, 90, 102 (June 30) (reiterating the idea of obliga-
tions erga oines as it applies to the right of the people to self-determination); Ap-
plication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (July 11) (Preliminary
Objections) (finding, in this case, that the rights and obligations decided on by the
Genocide Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes). Maurizio Ragazzi
provides an extended treatment of obligations erga omnes. See MAURIZIO
RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERG.4 OM.ES (1997)
(describing in depth and detail the idea of erga omnnes).
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involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their pro-
tection."' 14 5 Obligations erga omnes derive from, among others, the
prohibition of genocide and "from the principles and rules concern-
ing the basic rights of the human person, including protection from
slavery and racial discrimination."' 4 6 Based in part on this statement,
the International Law Institute supports the proposition that the gen-
eral obligation to respect human rights constitutes an obligation erga
omnes. 47 While normally stated as obligations of states, it would be
appropriate and logical, given their fundamental, international char-
acter, to apply obligations erga omnes to all international legal per-
sons, especially international organizations comprised of states such
as the Bank.
b. Responsibility
Having established that the Bank does have legal obligations Lin-
der international human rights law, I will now briefly touch upon the
issue of responsibility in respect of those obligations. Brownlie ob-
serves that "there is no compulsory system for review of the acts of'
organizations by bodies external to them. In this situation the con-
trols, such as they are, are provided by general international law. The
correlative of legal personality and a capacity to bring international
claims is responsibility." ''  According to Amerasinghe, the rules of
responsibility for international organizations under international law
may be defined in similar fashion to the rules of customary interna-
145. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (exploring further the idea of
erga onies and why states have these obligations).
146. Id. See also Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International human
Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-13 (describing the process used to determine
which rights are included in an erga omnes reach). Meron concludes that the ICJ's
opinion suggests that not all human rights constitute obligations erga omnes' only
those that "are firmly rooted in international law" qualify, Id. at 11. However, he
further notes that "international practice and scholarly opinion seem to have moved
well beyond the erga onines dictum of Barcelona Traction: perhaps the distinction
between basic human rights and human rights tout court, as regards their erga om?-
nes character, can no longer be supported." Id. at 13.
147. See RAGAZZI, supra note 144, at 144 (indicating the Institute of Interna-
tional Law's support of a general duty of respect for human rights).
148. BROWNLIE,supra note 68, at 701.
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tional law applying to state responsibility. 4 ' International organiza-
tions, including the Bank, are thus responsible for acts and omissions
imputable to them that breach their international obligations. " , With
regard to human rights law, international organizations are responsi-
ble for breaches of the obligation to respect internationally recog-
nized human rights, primarily those characterized as customary law
andjus cogens norms.' 1
In order to determine if a breach has occurred, the precise nature
of the obligation must be ascertained. For analytical purposes, human
rights obligations are divided into different levels, each requiring a
different level of commitment: positive, negative, or neutral.'" Posi-
tive obligations, such as the obligation to protect human rights and
the obligation to fulfill human rights, require affirmative measures
and acts in relation to both the substantive and procedural aspects of
rights.'53 The obligation to respect human rights is largely a negative
obligation requiring that the obligation holder refrain from violating
rights and act consistently therewith.' - Neutral obligations require
149. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 241 (analogizing between the cus-
tomary law of state responsibility and the responsibility of international organiza-
tions).
150. See Title and Texts of the Draft Articles on ResponsibilitY of States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Read-
ing, International Law Commission. 53d Sess.. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.I
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility] (codifying the law of state re-
sponsibility).
151. See Stud), Concerning The Right To Restitution. Comnpensation and Reha-
bilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights amid Fundamnen tl Free-
domns. Final Report Submitted by Mr. Theo von Boven. Special Rapporteur, Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, at 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (1993) [hereinafter
von Boven Report] (stressing the importance of customary international law and
that states and international organizations should follow it). See TIIEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY, LAW 136-245 (1989)
(detailing extensively the responsibility of international organizations to respect
human rights and humanitarian norms).
152. See generally SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 43-62 (discussing the evolution of
international human rights law and the methods utilized in remedying violations).
153. See id. (opining that the obligation to fulfill some rights is positive and re-
quires affirmative actions for protection).
154. See id. (indicating that most often obligations to protect human rights are
negative and certain behavior must be avoided in order to avoid violations).
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respect for present levels of (international) legal protection attributed
to a right; an obligation not to make the human rights situation
worse. 155
The obligations that attach to rules of customary international law
and peremptory norms are generally negative and neutral: to act in
accordance with and to refrain from violating these norms (negative),
and to respect the current level of enjoyment (neutral). These obliga-
tions apply to both internal and external acts of the Bank and in the
context of internal policies require that Bank policies account for,
and are consistent with, customary and peremptory human rights
norms. Amerasinghe states that international organizations' respon-
sibility for violation of obligations defined by customary interna-
tional law "will be based on fault, risk or absolute liability, as the
case may be, depending on the obligation and the content of the ap-
plicable customary international law."' 15 6
c. The Obligations of the Bank Vis-A-Vis the Human Rights
Obligations of its Members
While the Bank has rights and duties separate from and in addition
to its Member States, the obligations of its Members States also hold
relevance. The Bank, like any subject of the law, must ensure that it
neither undermines the ability of other subjects, including its mem-
bers, to faithfully fulfill their international obligations nor facilitates
or assists violation of those obligations.'57 This duty, in part, coin-
cides with the general principle of international law, pact sunt ser-
vanda; a treaty binds the parties and must be performed in good
faith.'58 The law of state responsibility is also of relevance here. Arti-
155. See id. at 45 (stating that neutral human rights obligations are those that a
state or international organization has to not interfere with fundamental human
rights).
156. AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 241 (indicating the basis of violations of
customary law by international organizations).
157. See Bradlow, supra note 15, at 63 (suggesting that in those countries that
are signatories to human rights conventions, the Bank must not undermine any ef-
forts to abide by the conventions); Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 110, at 428
(describing that international organizations must refrain from undermining respon-
sible countries and from supporting countries violating obligations).
158. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 339 (binding treaty parties to perform duties in good faith); Vienna
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cle 16 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Re-
sponsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts reads:
AID OR ASSISTANCE IN THE COMMISSION OF AN INTERNATIONALLY
WRONGFUL ACT. A State which aids or assists another State in the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally
responsible for doing so if: (a) That State does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) The act would
be internationally wrongful if committed by that State 159
The preceding adds an extra dimension to the obligations of the
Bank and requires that its policies and operations account for and re-
spect the obligations of its Members under ratified human rights
conventions, regional as well as universal, and other sources of law
binding on them. As parties to U.N. and regional human rights in-
struments, the Bank's Members must respect, ensure, and fulfill the
rights set forth in those instruments. What this means in practice will
vary depending on the specific obligations of the various Members of
the Bank and how those obligations are implicated in Bank-financed
activities. On a policy level, the Bank is obliged to ensure that policy
formulation and implementation account for and respect its Mem-
bers' human rights obligations. Bradlow and Grossman concur: "[In
general, it is safe to assume that the IFIs should perform their func-
tions in a way which supports the fundamental rights of individuals
and peoples." 160 As noted above, the Bank's policy on Environmental
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations
or Between International Organizations, supra note 88, art. 26, 25 ILM at 560
(holding parties bound to the treaty to perform it in good faith). See generally
LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 493-505 (1961) (explaining extensively the
principle of pact sunt servanda as the responsibility of parties to a treaty and the
generally accepted idea that a treaty cannot be terminated unilaterally).
159. Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 150, at 5 (holding a cooperat-
ing state responsible in many cases for internationally wrongful acts committed by
another state); see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (outlining the gen-
eral responsibility of states in the international community). For an extended
treatment of complicity in international law that the ILC considers to be a norm of
customary international law, and the drafting history of Article 16, see John Quig-
ley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law of State Respon-
sibility, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77 (explaining in detail the background of Arti-
cle 16).
160. Bradlow & Grossman, supra note 110, at 428 n.63 (arguing that although
precise legal responsibilities of international organizations may vary from nation to
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Assessment provides that it will not finance activities that contravene
a State's obligations under international environmental treaties."
Similar language and adherence thereto in the indigenous peoples
and other policies would satisfy the Bank's human rights obligation
at the policy level.
In summary, subjects of international law, including international
organizations such as the Bank, are obliged to refrain from violating,
and to respect, existing levels of legal protection accorded to human
rights characterized as customary international law and jtts cogens.
These obligations apply both to the Bank's internal and external ac-
tivities as human rights principles so characterized form part of the
internal and external legal order of the Bank. The Bank is interna-
tionally responsible for imputable breaches of these obligations.
Human rights conventions are not directly binding on the Bank, but
are relevant insofar as they restate and further develop binding
sources of law. The Bank also may not undermine its Members'
ability to faithfully fulfill their international human rights obligations
as defined by ratified instruments and other sources of binding law
and, therefore, must account for and respect these obligations in its
policies and operations.
Prior to drawing further conclusions about the full extent of Bank
obligations, the obligations of the Bank as a specialized agency of
the United Nations will be discussed. In doing so, a distinction must
be drawn between the obligations of Bank Members separately and
acting collectively through the Bank, and the obligations of the Bank
as a separate legal person and specialized agency under the Charter
of the U.N. While these obligations are related, they are nonetheless
distinct.
2. The Obligations of the Bank as a Specialized Agency of the United
Nations
The Bank was created in 1944, a year prior to the establishment of
the U.N. 6' Its status as a specialized agency of the U.N., and the na-
nation, they always include an obligations to support fundamental human rights).
161. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (outlining the previously
existing environmental policies of the Bank).
162. See The World Bank Group: About Us, at http://www.worldbank.org/about
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ture of the relationship between the Bank and U.N., is based upon
and defined by a treaty known as the Relationship Agreement.'63
This Relationship Agreement was made pursuant to Articles 57 and
63 of the U.N. Charter."64 Article 4(3) of the Relationship Agreement
stresses the Bank's independence and recognizes that:
action to be taken by the Bank on any loan matter is to be determined by
the independent exercise of the Bank's own judgment in accordance with
the Bank's Articles of Agreement. The United Nations recognises, there-
fore, that it would be sound policy to refrain from making recommenda-
tions to the Bank with respect to particular loans or with respect to the
terms or conditions of financing by the Bank.'
165
While the relationship created by this provision between the U.N.
and the Bank provides for a much looser association than exists be-
tween the U.N. and other specialized agencies, it relates only to U.N.
involvement in Bank decision-making processes rather than any
larger responsibility the Bank may have under the U.N. Charter or
international law in general. As evidenced by the General Assembly
resolutions on South Africa and Portugal, the U.N., at least in the
1960s, opined that this provision did not preclude it from calling on
the Bank to refuse loans due to the "conduct of a State affecting its
fundamental Charter obligations."'' 66 Skogly observes that, "part of
the reasoning behind bringing these organizations [specialized agen-
(stating that the bank was established July 1. 1944).
163. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Nov. 15, 1947, 16 U.N.T.S. 346 [hereinafter
Relationship Agreement] (defining the terms on which the United Nations and the
Bank established a formalized relationship).
164. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 57, 63 (establishing the existence and obligations
of specialized agencies under the Charter).
165. Relationship Agreement, supra note 163, 16 U.N.T.S. at 348 (limiting the
authority that the United Nations has over the Bank, in relation to this Agreement).
166. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Bank
cannot take any action contrary to the Charter). Bleicher agrees, noting that the
variation in national policies and political character is not legitimate, however,
where the conduct of a state runs contrary to its obligations under the U.N. Charter.
Colonialism and apartheid are not the 'political affairs' of the states which pursue
them but are violations of the basic law of the community of nations. See Samuel
A. Bleicher, U.N. v. IBRD: A Dilemma of Functionalism, 24 INT'L ORG. 31, 41
(1970) (stating his opinion that although there are differences in national policy,
they still may not violate the Charter).
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cies] into a formalized relationship with the U.N. must have been to
grant them, both legally and practically, rights and obligations in re-
lationship to the U.N ..... 167 These obligations, at a minimum, in-
clude respect for the principles and purposes of the U.N..
If this reasoning is correct, as a specialized agency of the U.N., the
Bank has obligations derived from the U.N. Charter, in particular to
act in conformity with the Charter. 68 Lauwaars concurs, stating that
"Not only must the treaty establishing the organization between U.N.
Member States be in accordance with the Charter and the obligations
imposed upon the Member States by the Charter, but the decisions of
the new organization itself must also comply with the Charter."' '16
This means that the Bank's policies, internal and external, and op-
erations must be formulated and implemented in accordance with the
Charter's provisions on human rights. As noted above, the U.N.
Charter supercedes the Bank's Articles. 7 ' This also implies that the
Bank's Articles, particularly the interpretation given to the political
prohibition, should be read consistently with the U.N. Charter and its
human rights provisions.
The Charter's provisions dealing with human rights are rudimen-
tary and lack specificity.' 7' Other than self-determination, the Charter
only explicitly mentions the prohibition of discrimination. I Partly
for this reason, in 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
167. SKOGLY, sup-a note 10, at 100 (explaining, perhaps, the reasoning of the
U.N. in forming relationships with certain international organizations).
168. Id. at 99-102 (insisting that the Bank's status as a specialize agency causes
it to be obligated to act in accordance with the U.N. and the Charter).
169. R.H. Lauwaars, The Interrelationship Between United Nations Law and the
Law of Other International Organizations, 82 MICH. L.R. 1604, 1605 (1984) (dis-
cussing that since almost all international organizations are formed with treaties,
most likely they all must act in accordance with the Charter at all times); see also
Bradlow, supra note 15, at 63 (indicating that as a specialized agency of the U.N.,
the Bank must act in conformity with the U.N. Charter); SKOGLY, supra note 10, at
101-2 (finding that the Bank must always act in accordance with the U.N. Charter,
both with previous and future acts).
170. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (explaining how the U.N.
Charter takes a more dominant role in formulating Bank policies and procedures).
171. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text (exploring the power of the
U.N. Charter over the actions and obligations of the Bank).
172. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 2, 3 (stating specifically the U.N.'s inten-
tion of protecting self-determination and opposing many forms of discrimination).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights to elaborate upon and spec-
ify the Charter's human rights provisions and obligations. 73 The
Universal Declaration expresses general principles of international
law and binding norms of customary law despite its non-binding
status when adopted.'74 Subsequent codification of human rights by
the U.N., the International Covenants, and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD")-cu-
mulatively known as the International Bill of Rights-in particular,
has also clarified any ambiguity in the meaning of the Charter's pro-
visions. Professor Sohn observes that, although the Covenants:
resemble traditional international agreements which bind only those who
ratify them, it seems clear that they partake of the creative force found in
the Declaration and constitute in a similar fashion an authoritative inter-
pretation of the basic rules of international law on the subject of human
rights which are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Conse-
quently ... they are of some importance ... with respect to the interpre-
tation of the Charter obligations of the non-rati fying states. 75
Presumably this would also apply to the Charter obligations of
non-ratifying subjects of international law, especially members of the
U.N. system such as the Bank. The jurisprudence of the U.N. bodies,
such as the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the
Elimination of All Racial Discrimination, charged with monitoring
state compliance with human rights instruments, is also important in
this context. 176 Their interpretations of the human rights instruments
173. See Bruno Simma, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY:
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 263 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995) (stating that partly
because the Charter contained so few human rights provisions, the U.N. adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948).
174. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 272-4 (describing the evolution of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights from a mere aspiration to a widely accepted legal requirement); see also
SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 120-5 (describing the birth of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and how it has become largely a part of customary international
law that binds all subjects of international law): United States Diplomatic and Con-
sular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24) (recognizing the
obligatory force of the Charter and the Declaration in finding that Iran deprived
people of their freedom and subjected them to physical hardship).
175. Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L L. J.
129, 135-6 (1977).
176. See id. at 136 (indicating the participation of certain U.N. agencies in the
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not only inform the obligations of state-parties, they also develop
greater understanding of the nature of Charter-based obligations.
The precise nature of the obligations of the Bank, particularly the
extent thereof, under the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions re-
quires further examination that is beyond the scope of this paper. For
the time being, consider that, at a minimum, the Bank is required to
respect the hierarchically superior authority of the Charter's human
rights provisions by acting consistently therewith.'77 This is espe-
cially the case as one of the overriding purposes of the U.N. is "pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or re-
ligion."' 78 This duty to respect also applies to the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and, to a lesser extent, the Covenants and
CERD as authoritative interpretations of the Charter's human rights
provisions. 179
In practice, the nature and extent of the Bank's obligations under
the Charter, while important, are not determinative of its overall hu-
man rights obligations. The Bank, as a subject of international law,
must respect customary normsjus cogens, and general principles of
international law and large parts of the Universal Declaration con-
stitute international custom, as do parts of CERD, the Covenants, and
other international human rights instruments. The Bank also has ob-
ligations in relation to its Members' obligations.
The obligations of the Bank's Members are relatively straightfor-
ward. As members of the U.N., the U.N. Charter binds Bank Mem-
bers 8 ' "to take a joint and separate action in cooperation with the
execution of instruments of human rights); see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 57, 63
(creating specialized agencies under the U.N. and outlining their obligations).
177. See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text (explaining the Bank's ob-
ligations to comply with the provisions of the Charter, including its human rights
provisions).
178. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
179. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text (detailing the realized ne-
cessity for the formulation of the Universal Declaration).
180. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1970 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21) (holding that members of the U.N. cannot
violate the Charter in any way). On the binding status of the Charter's human
rights provisions, see MERON, supra note 151, at 79-84 (explaining the obligations
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Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55 ."1" Article 55 requires the U.N. to promote "universal respect for,
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. '"' The Bank
is essentially a collection of states, all bound by the obligation set
forth in Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter to take joint action to
promote universal respect for human rights upon ratification of the
Bank's Article of Agreement. The Bank is one place where such
joint action is required.
Shihata confirms that the Bank is "bound, by virtue of its Rela-
tionship Agreement with the U.N., to take note of the above men-
tioned Charter obligations assumed by its members."'' 3 As discussed
above, the Bank must do more than just recognize the legal obliga-
tions of its Members, it cannot undermine their ability to faithfully
fulfill their obligations, nor facilitate or assist with violation of those
obligations. Consequently, the Bank's Members are obligated to act
in accordance with their Charter obligations in the course of their
participation in Bank activities and the Bank is obligated to not un-
dermine their ability to do so. The former is most likely stronger for
the borrowing Members of the Bank as their dealings with Bank di-
rectly affect their populations.
The relevance of the Bank's status as a specialized agency of the
U.N. to its human rights obligations is twofold. First, it permits con-
sideration of the progeny of the Charter's human rights provisions
when assessing the overall obligations of the Bank. These obligations
therefore are not limited only to customary law, general principles
andjus cogens, but also flow from the general obligations imposed
by the U.N. Charter as interpreted and set forth in U.N. human rights
instruments. 8 4 As authoritative interpretations of the Charter, the
involved in certain provisions of the U.N. Charter).
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (emphasizing the importance to the U.N. of pro-
moting fundamental human rights).
182. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c (establishing the U.N.'s stance on discrimi-
nation and its intention of promoting certain freedoms).
183. SHIHATA, supra note 59. at 76 (emphasizing that the Bank's obligation to
comply with the Charter may be even more enforced than other international or-
ganizations as a result of the Relationship Agreement it has with the U.N.).
184. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1. 55, 56 (outlining the U.N.'s intention to promote
fundamental human rights).
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Universal Declaration, the Covenants, and, to a lesser extent, other
U.N. human rights instruments inform and illuminate the nature and
extent of Bank obligations. As with customary law, the precise na-
ture of these obligations in a given case will depend on the circum-
stances. At a minimum, the Bank is required to respect the core ele-
ments of the rights set forth in U.N. human rights conventions.
Second, the Bank's Members are obligated to comply with the
Charter's human rights provisions in their conduct within the
Bank. 85 Also, although this will apply to any intergovernmental or-
ganization, the Bank must account for and not undermine the obliga-
tions of its Members under the Charter and U.N. human rights in-
struments. 
8 6
3. Sustainable Development
Prior to turning to the content of draft OP 4.10 on Indigenous Peo-
ples and its compatibility with international human rights standards, I
will briefly raise an issue of relevance to the subject at hand that re-
quires a great deal more attention in connection with the international
legal obligations of the Bank.'87 I am referring to Judge Weeraman-
try's conclusion that the law of sustainable development is custom-
ary international law.'88 A number of scholars have also found that
the law of sustainable development is part of general international
law and binding on international organizations, including the
Bank. 189
185. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 (stating the U.N.'s decision to promote funda-
mental human rights),
186. Id.
187. See Handl, supra note 72 (addressing legal obligations of the Bank di-
rectly).
188. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 25)
(separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (opining that sustainable development is
more than a theory, it is a part of international law), available t
www.icjcij.org/icjwww/docket/ihs/ihssummaries/ihssummary_19970925.html.
189. See Handl, supra note 72, at 662 ("[T]here is no denying, of course, First,
that there exists today a growing and ever more specific body of norms of interna-
tional law bearing on 'sustainable development;' and second, that a large number
of these concepts clearly represent affirmative duties upon states and international
organizations, including MDBs, alike.").
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The law of sustainable development involves three core compo-
nents: human rights law, environmental law, and law applying to
economic development.' 90 These core components are so intertwined
with the concept of sustainable development that it is impossible to
pursue and fulfill the latter without addressing all three elements.
Sands describes the international law of sustainable development as
"a broad umbrella accommodating the specialized fields of interna-
tional law which aim to promote economic development, environ-
mental protection, and respect for civil and political rights."' 9 ' The
Bank's mandate is directly related to sustainable development and it
actively subscribes to the principle. As discussed above, customary
international law also binds the Bank.
The concept and law of sustainable development incorporates all
human rights within its ambit.1 92 The U.N. General Assembly, for in-
stance, resolved that "democracy, respect for all human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, transpar-
ent and accountable governance in all sectors of society, as well as
effective participation by civil society, are ... an essential part of the
necessary foundations for the realization of social and people-centred
sustainable development."' 93 To what extent "all human rights" can
be said to be part of the customary law of sustainable development is
questionable. However, access to information, informed participa-
tion, due process guarantees, effective judicial remedies, special
190. See Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 92 (-The principle of
sustainable development is thus a part of modern international law by reason not
only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and general
acceptance by the global community."). Judge Weeramantry added that -[t~he
components of the principle come from well-established areas of international
law-human rights, State responsibility, environmental law, economic and indus-
trial law, equity, territorial sovereignty, abuse of rights, good neighbourliness-to
mention a few." Id. Others have added that -[t]he three pillars [of sustainable de-
velopment] are composed of international environmental law, international human
rights law and international economic law." See Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable
Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception, 45 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 796, 796-97 (1996).
191. Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development,
BRIT. YB INT'LL. 303, 378-79 (1994).
192. See Handl, supra note 72, at 662 (stating the inclusion of human rights law
in sustainable development).
193. Progranne for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, G.A. Res. S-
19/2, U.N. GAOR, Annex (June 28, 1997). quoted in, Handl, supra note 72, at 64.
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guarantees for indigenous peoples and other so-called vulnerable
groups, and rights related to environmental health and safety are
certainly primary candidates.
The Bank's Operational Policies and its good governance pro-
grams address some of these issues, at least in part. 94 Nonetheless, it
is safe to assert that it has not met the ftll extent of its human rights
obligations inherent in the law of sustainable development through
these policies and programs. For instance, many vitally important
documents related to Bank-financed projects and programs are rou1-
tinely labeled private property of the Borrower and, therefore, Lin-
available to the public.'95 Further attention is required to a wide range
of human rights directly relevant to sustainable development, in-
cluding those core elements partially listed in the previous paragraph.
As we shall see below, this is especially the case for the rights of in-
194. See THE WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 83,
at 13-39 (explaining the Bank's policies on accountability and transparency).
195. See generally The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information (World
Bank 1994); World Bank Procedure 17.50 on Disclosure of Operational hlnbrna-
tion (World Bank 1993) (describing the procedures for making documents public
which are currently under review), at
<//wb I nOO18.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual. nsf/bprow/214F76B6
9F9D07E68525672C007D07A4?OpenDocument> (last visited Nov. 5, 2001); set,
also Letter from Toby Mendel, Head of Law Programme, Article 19, to James D.
Wolfensohn, President, The World Bank (Feb. 16, 2001) (criticizing the Inforna-
tion Disclosure Policy of the Bank as inadequate and considerably substantial in
relation to human rights guarantees), at
http://www.worldbank.org/infoshop/disclsoure/letters.htm (last visited Nov. 7.
2001); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, opened Jor signature
June 13, 1992, principle 10, at
http://www.unep.org/documents/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD I 163.
In connection with this, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, adopted at U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in
1992, states that:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is hekl by
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities
in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making
processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and partici-
pation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be pro-
vided.
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digenous peoples.'96
The law of sustainable development is not only relevant to the
Bank's general international obligations, but also relates to interpre-
tation of its Articles:
196. It is extremely doubtful that Bank policies on Indigenous Peoples and espe-
cially Involuntary Resettlement meet sustainable development standards. Principle
22 of the Rio Declaration provides that: "Indigenous people and their communities,
and other local communities, have a vital role in environmental management and
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should
recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their ef-
fective participation in the achievement of sustainable development." See Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 195, at principle 22.
Chapter 26 of Agenda 21 is entirely devoted to indigenous peoples. It reads:
In full partnership with indigenous people and their communities, Govern-
ments and, where appropriate, intergovernmental organizations should aim
at fulfilling the following objectives:
(a) Establishment of a process to empower indigenous people and their com-
munities through measures that include: (i) Adoption or strengthening of ap-
propriate policies and/or legal instruments at the national level; (ii) Recogni-
tion that tire lands of indigenous people and their coninunities should be
protected fiom activities that are environientally unsound or that the indige-
nous people concerned consider to be socially and culturall' inappropriate;
(iii) Recognition that their values, traditional knowledge and resource man-
agement practices with a view to promoting environmentally sound and sus-
tainable development; (iv) Recognition that traditional and direct dependence
on renewable resources and ecosystems, including sustainable harvesting,
continues to be essential to the cultural, economic and physical well-being of
indigenous people and their communities; (v) Development and strengthening
of national dispute resolution arrangements in relation to the settlement of
land and resource management concerns; (vi) Support for alternative envi-
ronmentally sound means of production to ensure a range of choices on how
to improve their quality of life so that they effectively participate in sustain-
able development; (vii) Enhancement of capacity-building for indigenous
communities, based on the adaptation and exchange of traditional experience,
knowledge and resource-management practices, to ensure their sustainable
development; (b) Establishment, where appropriate, of arrangements to
strengthen the active participation of indigenous people and their communi-
ties in the national formulation of policies, laws and programmes relating to
resource management and other development processes that may affect them,
and their initiation of proposals for such policies and programmes; (c) In-
volvement of indigenous people and their communities at the national and lo-
cal levels in resource management and conservation strategies and other rele-
vant programmes established to support and review sustainable development
strategies, such as those suggested in other programme areas of Agenda 21.
Agenda 21: Earth's Action Plan, 508-09 (Nicholas A. Robinson, ed., 1993) (em-
phasis added).
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In short, international normative concepts-including both general inter-
national law (customary international law and general principles of law)
and, in certain circumstances, provisions of widely adhered to multilateral
environmental agreements-do provide a dimension against which
MDBs' articles of agreement can and must be viewed to make allowance
for the sea change in international public policy epitomized by "sustain-
able development.
Thus, the increasing visibility of the normative implications of sustainable
development has had a twofold effect: First, the progressive "internation-
alization" of decision making in the field of natural resource management
and the environment, which may traditionally have been a matter only of
domestic concern, clearly undercuts the persuasiveness of the claim that
expanded MDB conditionalities amount to unacceptable interference with
[Developing Member Countries'] "political affairs." For, to analogize to
the Permanent Court of International Justice's holding in the Advisory
Opinion on Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, the scope of what con-
stitutes "political affairs" at any given time is relative and depends on the
development of international law. Second. and equally important, MDBs
themselves can no longer afford to treat environmental and social con-
cerns as merely incidental to development projects, but have an affirma-
tive duty to incorporate these issues into the mainstream of their devel-
opment-financing operations. 
197
In the context of human rights law, this argument is fundamental
to interpreting the position of the Bank and its Articles within the
international legal system and the obligations applying to it as a
subject of that system.
4. Conclusion
The Bank, both as a subject of international law and as a special-
ized agency of the U.N., has clear obligations concerning human
rights. These obligations are separate from and in addition to those of
its Members and apply to its internal and external operations.'" As a
subject of international law, the Bank is bound to respect norms of
customary law, general principles of international law and peremp-
tory norms, including those pertaining to human rights.' These ob-
197. Handl, supra note 71, at 647-48.
198. See AMERASINGHE, supra note 123, at 229 (discussing the legal obligations
placed on the bank through international law).
199. See id. at 240-47 (defining the legal boundaries of the Bank's policies in
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ligations are generally negative and neutral, requiring that the Bank
refrain from violating human rights norms and respect the present
level of international legal protection attributed to human rights." Its
status as a specialized agency adds the duty to respect the core ele-
ments of human rights traceable to the binding provisions of the U.N.
Charter. The law of sustainable development, at least those parts of it
constituting customary international law, further defines the nature of
the Bank's human rights obligations. 20' In both cases, the Bank is
obligated not to undermine the ability of its members to faithfully
fulfill their international obligations nor to facilitate or assist with
violation of those obligations.0 2
In practice, the preceding has three effects. First, it amounts to a
duty to ensure that the Bank's policies account for and respect hu-
man rights standards, especially those defined as customary norms
andjus cogens. Second, it ensures that the Bank's lending and other
operations are consistent with both its own and its Members' inter-
national obligations-one way to do so is by incorporation of, and
explicit reference to, these obligations in its internal policies. Lastly,
it requires that human rights issues inform all aspects of Bank prac-
tice.
The purpose of the preceding discussion is to provide a framework
for the analysis of OP 4.10 below. 20 3 If the Bank is to comply with its
human rights and other obligations, the OP must account for and re-
spect indigenous peoples' human rights and ensure that the obliga-
tions of its members are addressed. As we shall see, although the
Bank has recognized the centrality of human rights to its mission and
the international arena).
200. See SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 43-62 (defining the types of human rights
obligations).
201. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 92 (defining sustainable
development as customary law): see also Handl, supra note 72, at 662 (explaining
what type of law is involved in the discussion of sustainable development).
202. See Handl, supra note 72, at 662 (explaining the Bank's obligation to avoid
undermining its members' human rights responsibilities).
203. See THOMAS GRIFFITHS & MARCUS COLCHtESTER. REPORT ON A
WORKSHOP ON 'INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, FORESTS AND TIlE WORLD BANK: POLICIES
AND PRACTICES' 12 (2000) (describing the extensive revision process that the
Bank has been implementing beginning in 1996) at
http://www.bicusa.org/mdbs/wbg/FinalsynthesisOctober2OOO.pdf.
2002]
AM. U. INT' L. REV.
has taken some action to promote human rights in general, the pres-
ent draft OP 4.10 not only falls short of accounting for indigenous
peoples' human rights, it is in direct contravention of those rights.""
The Bank may assert that its role in promoting human rights is stra-
tegically focused on poverty and is limited by its Articles, but it can-
not justify, by reference to its Articles or any other source, adopting a
policy statement that deviates from its international obligations and
undermines indigenous peoples' rights by, among others, setting
standards below those already binding on almost all of its Members
by virtue of ratified human rights instruments. Moreover, the provi-
sions of OP 4.10 run counter to what the Bank has identified as pre-
requisites for poverty reduction, especially in the case of property
rights and reducing conflict.205
III. OP 4.10 AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' HUMAN
RIGHTS
Despite the efforts made by the United Nations and Governments over re-
cent years, indigenous peoples continue to experience exclusion, dis-
crimination, and marginalization in many of the countries in which they
live. They are often poorly served by education, health, housing, and other
services. They are also disproportionately affected by national develop-
ment activities which displace them from their traditional lands and terri-
tories, often with negligible or no compensation, making them victims of
development rather than its beneficiaries. 206
This section of the article analyzes draft OP 4.10 on Indigenous
Peoples of March 2001, and compares it with international human
rights standards pertaining to indigenous peoples. Reference is also
made to other World Bank safeguard policies, such as draft OP 4.12
on Involuntary Resettlement,0 7 when warranted. Rather than attempt
204. See id. (explaining Draft OP 4.10's failure to account for the rights of in-
digenous peoples).
205. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
206. Mary Robinson, Statement Given to the United Nations High Coinmis-
sioner for Human Rights, Substantive Session of 2001, Economic and Social
Council (July 24, 2001) (on file with author).
207. See generally THE WORLD BANK, THi WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL
MANUAL, DRAFT OPERATIONAL POLICIES (OP 4.12) (Mar. 6, 2001) [hereinafter
DRAFT OP 4.12], available at http:// wblnOO18.worldbank.org/ Networks/ ESSD/
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a comprehensive analysis of the OP, I have chosen to highlight three
issues: indigenous land rights, participation rights, and rights in rela-
tion to involuntary resettlement. These issues involve a range of
other rights and issues, land rights especially, which implicate,
among others, cultural rights, privacy rights, religious freedom
rights, children's rights, as well as the majority of economic and so-
cial rights. These other rights will be touched upon as necessary. I
begin with a brief overview of the history of Bank policies concern-
ing indigenous peoples to provide some background to the present
policy.
A. BACKGROUND
As early as 1981, the Bank published a document entitled Eco-
nomic Development and Tribal Peoples: Human Ecologic Consid-
erations, which sought to provide guidelines for Bank operations.21
The document states that the Bank should avoid "unnecessary or
avoidable encroachment onto territories used or occupied by tribal
groups;" ruled out Bank involvement with projects not agreed to by
tribal peoples; required guarantees from borrowers that they would
implement safeguard measures; and advocated respect for indigenous
peoples' right to self-determination, at least in its economic and so-
cial aspects. °9
This was followed in 1982 by an internal policy directive, Opera-
tional Manual Statement 2.34 Tribal People Bank-Financed Projects
("OMS 2.34"). Despite being written "after internal and external
condemnation of the disastrous experiences of indigenous groups in
Bank-financed projects in the Amazon region," ' this internal policy
was weaker than, and failed to incorporate the protections contained
icdb.nsf/D4856F 112E805DF4852566C9007C27A6/E80C5 I C4A005E6EA85256A
100078DC88/SFILE/Draft+OP412.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
208. ROBERT GOODLAND, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TRIBAL PEOPLES:
HUMAN ECOLOGIC CONSIDERATIONS (World Bank 1982).
209. See id. at 3, 27 (expressing the guidelines for World Bank projects in areas
affecting tribal peoples).
210. See Kingsbury, supra note 120, at 324 (explaining that the Bank wrote the
Operational Manual Statement 2.34 on Tribal People Bank-Financed Projects after
much criticism of its operations in the Amazon region).
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in, the 1981 document noted above."' Moreover, an internal imple-
mentation review conducted in 1986-87 found that only two of
thirty-three Bank projects substantially complied with the policy. 22
Implementation failures and sustained criticism of Bank projects by
indigenous peoples, NGOs and others," 3 led the Bank to revise and
update OMS 2.34, concluding in 1991 with the adoption of Opera-
tional Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples ("OD 4.20").214
OD 4.20 strengthened Bank policy concerning indigenous peoples
by requiring the informed participation of indigenous people; ac-
counting for indigenous preferences in project design; strengthening
domestic legislation on indigenous rights; paying special attention to
securing indigenous land and resource rights; and developing spe-
cialized Indigenous Peoples' Development Plans to provide for cul-
turally appropriate benefits and mitigation plans in all projects af-
fecting indigenous peoples.1 5 While OD 4.20 is an improvement
over its predecessor, it has not assuaged critics of Bank projects, es-
pecially since compliance with the policy has been inconsistent at
best.21 6 An internal review of seventy-two Bank projects in Latin
211. See id. (explaining the weakness of the 1982 policy directive).
212. See OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, WORLD BANK,
TRIBAL PEOPLES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A FIvE YEAR IMPLEMENTATION
REVIEW OF OMS 2.34 (1982-1986) AND A TRIBAL PEOPLES' ACTION PLAN (1987)
(finding that projects were not complying with the new procedures for work in-
volving tribal peoples).
213. See generally Andrew Gray, Development Policy. Development Protest:
The World Bank, Indigenous Peoples and NGOs, in THE STRUGGLE FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS
267 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998) (describing Bank projects and
policies affecting indigenous peoples and criticism thereof).
214. See Shelton Davis, The World Bank and Operational Directive 4.20: The
World Bank and Indigenous People, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS 75 (Lydia van de Fliert ed., 1994) (discussing the revision process
completed by the Bank as to their policy on tribal people and the contours of the
new policy, OD 4.20).
215. See Kingsbury, supra note 120, at 329 ("Operational Directives have thus
been understood to be 'binding' on Bank staff within the Bank management struc-
ture, but applied and enforced flexibly rather than 'legalistically."').
216. See id. at 327-29 (explaining that noncompliance with the Bank's policies
happens regularly for many reasons); see also Gray, supra note 213, at 288 (de-
scribing that while there are several opportunities for the application of the new
policy there is no evidence yet of the effectiveness of compliance); see also
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America, for instance, found that over one-third of the projects failed
to incorporate the required Indigenous Peoples Development Plan
and only half of the projects involved consultation with indigenous
authorities about project design and implementation. - 7
In 1993, the Bank began to convert its internal policies to a new
format: obligatory operational policies, obligatory Bank procedures,
and non-binding good practices. 1 s In 1996, an internal, ad hoc
working group initiated conversion of OD 4.20 to this format. '9 The
Bank developed an Approach Paper and publicly distributed the pa-
per in 1998, following the distribution with a series of consultations
with indigenous peoples and NGOs at the end of the same year.220
The Bank then worked internally on a draft policy, which it said
would be made public for further consultation in July 2000.2' Due to
internal Bank approval procedures and a contentious internal debate
about the role of Operational Policies-not to mention a highly criti-
cal Inspection Panel report on the China Western Poverty Reduction
Project that directly dealt with OD 4.20 and found serious violations
of this policy as well as those on Environmental Assessment, Invol-
untary Resettlement, Natural Habitats, Pest Management, and Infor-
mation Disclosure-the Bank did not release the draft policy, re-
GRIFFITHS & COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 9-10 (noting substantial failures to
comply with the policy).
217. See K. Swartz & J. Urquillas, Aplicacion de la Politica del Banco Sobre
law Poblaciones Indigenas (OD 4.20) en America Latina (1992-1997) (Oficina
Regional de America Latina y el Caribe, Banco Mundial 1999), cited in GRIFFITHS
& COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 16 (explaining that projects that did comply
with the policy were specifically focused on indigenous peoples and were still in
the preparation phase of the project).
218. See GRIFFITHS & COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 8-11 (discussing the in-
ternal revision process of the Bank).
219. See id. at 12 (describing the extensive revision process that the Bank im-
plemented beginning in 1996).
220. See S. Davis et al., Approach Paper on Revision of OD 4.20 on Indigenous
Peoples (recommending certain revisions to OD 4.20, specifically to identification
of indigenous peoples, policy objectives and framework, and measures and proce-
dures to facilitate policy implementation), at http:// wbln00l8.worldbank.org/
essd/essd.nsf/28354584d9d97c29852567cc00780e2a/5e23e566bed37cd6852567cc
0077f48d?OpenDocument (last visited on Nov. 5, 2001).
221. See id.
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named OP 4.10, until March 2001.222 In June 2001, the Bank an-
nounced that it would hold further consultations with indigenous
peoples and interested NGOs between August and October 2001
(later extended to February 2002)-a timeframe heavily criticized by
indigenous peoples who are becoming increasingly frustrated with
the Bank's approach to public consultation and increasingly critical
of the text of the draft policy 223-and that the policy would be final-
ized by early 2002.
The draft OP is substantially based on OD 4.20. During the revi-
sion process, the Bank, according to its own statements, attempted to
maintain the level of OD 4.20 while at the same time providing
greater clarity to its language as part of improving implementation
and compliance rates. Whether the Bank achieved greater clarity is
debatable. It is clear, however, that the Bank weakened the policy in
certain important respects, particularly the participation standard.
Moreover, maintaining the standard set by OD 4.20 fails to account
for a substantial evolution in international law and practice concern-
ing indigenous rights that has occurred since 1991.224 This is all the
more disturbing given that when the Bank wrote OD 4.20 in 1991, it
did not meet international human rights standards. 25
Finally, indigenous peoples and NGOs have long maintained that
222. See, GRIFFITHS & COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 12 (stating the reasons
for the delay in the release of OP 4.10 was because of review procedures at the
Bank and the Inspection Panel's report on the Bank's previous failures with in-
digenous peoples).
223. See Indigenous Peoples, Statement at the 19th Session of the U.N.WGIP
(July 29, 2001) (on file with author) (criticizing that draft OP 4.10 "does not build
upon and reinforce the positive language in the existing policy; fails to incorporate
many of the key recommendations made by indigenous peoples during previous
consultations on the Bank's "approach paper" on the revision process; uses hn-
guage that confuses consultation with effective participation; lacks binding provi-
sions that seek to guarantee indigenous land and resource security; fails to recog-
nize the right to free, informed prior consent; does not prohibit the involuntary
resettlement of indigenous peoples; is not consistent with existing and emerging
international standards on human rights and sustainable development; and does not
advance international standards for dealing with indigenous peoples in develop-
ment.").
224. See OP 4.10, sup-a note 37, at 9 (explaining the types of participation that
indigenous peoples would have under the revised policy).
225. See sup-a notes 218-23 and accompanying text (outlining the changes in
law that affect the Bank and its obligations to human rights).
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any revision of the Bank's policy should be done pursuant to an im-
plementation review of the existing policy. - 6 This review, particu-
larly the lessons learned from implementation and compliance fail-
ures, should feed into the larger process of revising the policy. In
March 2001, the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department an-
nounced that such a review would take place. This review is pres-
ently underway, with completion of Phase I expected in the first half
of 2002. Bank staff charged with the policy revision have stated,
however, that they will only incorporate the lessons of Phase I of the
OED review, rather than waiting for the findings of Phase II (De-
cember 2002).227 The latter is a participatory field review of Bank
projects that will incorporate indigenous peoples' perspectives into
the conclusions of the overall review, as well as deal more fully with
compliance issues.228
As we can see, the Bank's policy towards indigenous peoples has
improved since 1982. However, progress has been mostly cosmetic
in the absence of a clear commitment by the Bank to implement and
comply with the policy. Internal reviews, as well as frequent com-
plaints by indigenous peoples, repeatedly demonstrate that compli-
ance failure rates are far beyond acceptable.22' This is not to say the
indigenous peoples do not benefit from some Bank projects, espe-
cially those projects specifically designed to benefit them, or that
compliance failures are always entirely the fault of the Bank. None-
theless, these failures have sometimes been associated with serious
human rights abuses and a substantial decline in standard of living
for affected indigenous peoples.20 While the Bank often character-
226. See GRIFFITHS & COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 4 (stating that one of the
obstacles to an effective policy is the lack of an attempt to create policies that
match international human rights standards).
227. See id. (listing the recommendations given to the Bank to improve the pol-
icy including a participatory implementation review).
228. Phase I of the project is a desk-based review of over 100 projects in six dif-
ferent geographical regions affecting Indigenous peoples. See WORLD BANK,
OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, PROTECTING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: AN
OED EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 4.20, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/oedlindigenouspeople/docs/ipsevaluation.pdf.
229. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
230. See GRIFFITHS & COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 16 (showing the lack of
compliance exhibited by the Bank).
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izes these situations as "learning experiences," for indigenous peo-
ples and others they are clearly unacceptable and create lasting ad-
verse impacts on their quality of life.
B. THE POLICY ITSELF
Paragraph 1 of OP 4.10 states that its "broad objective" is to "en-
sure that development process fosters full respect for the dignity,
human rights and cultures of indigenous peoples, thereby contribut-
ing to the Bank's mission of poverty reduction and sustainable de-
velopment. 2 ' Paragraph 2 recognizes that the "identities, cultures,
lands and resources of indigenous peoples are uniquely intertwined
and especially vulnerable to changes caused by development pro-
grams.2 32 Consequently, indigenous peoples require "special meas-
ures" to ensure that they are not disadvantaged by development pro-
grams and that they participate in and benefit from them.233
The broad objective set out in paragraph 1 is consistent with the
Bank's statements above concerning the relationship between human
rights and the Bank's mission of poverty reduction and sustainable
development.234 Logically, if the Bank is to ensure and foster "full
respect for the dignity, human rights and cultures of indigenous peo-
ples,' 235 the OP should both account for and be consistent with in-
digenous peoples' human rights. The same is also true for the nature
of the "special measures" envisaged in paragraph 2. Additionally, as
the Bank acknowledges that indigenous peoples are especially vul-
nerable, particular care and diligence should be required when ap-
plying the safeguards set out in the OP.
As we shall see, this is not the case, both in terms of consistency
with human rights standards and the procedures that must be fol-
lowed to implement the policy. In discussing this, I will extensively
refer to international human rights standards set forth in conventions
of general application (as well as those directly dealing with indige-
231. OP 4.10, supra note 37, para. I.
232. Id. para. 2.
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (explaining the goals of so-
cial development).
235. OP 4.10, supra note 37, para. 1.
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nous peoples' rights), the jurisprudence of the bodies charged with
oversight of those conventions, customary international law, and
emerging standards on indigenous peoples' rights as set forth in the
U.N. draft Declaration and the Proposed American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous.
1. Land and Resources - OP 4.10, paragraphs 12 and 13"'
Paragraphs 12 and 13 of OP 4.10 read as follows:
12. The economies, identities and forms of social organization of indige-
nous peoples are often closely tied to land, water and other natural re-
sources. Therefore, in Bank-assisted projects which affect indigenous
peoples, the Borrower takes into account their individual and collective
rights to use and develop the lands that they occupy, to continue to have
access to natural resources vital to their subsistence, to the sustainability
of their cultures, and to their future development:
13. In order to avoid or minimize adverse impacts of Bank-assisted proj-
ects on affected indigenous groups, and to determine measures which may
be needed to enhance their security over lands and other resources, in the
design of the project the Borrower gives particular attention to:
(a) the cultural, religious and sacred values that these groups attribute to
their lands and resources;
(b) their individual and communal or collective rights to use and develop
the lands they occupy and to be protected against encroachment;
(c) their customary use of the natural resources vital to their cultures and
ways of life; and
(d) their natural resources management practices and the long-term
sustainability of these practices.
Where a Bank-assisted project has an impact on the lands and resources
occupied or used by indigenous peoples and taking into account the Bor-
rower's legislation, consideration is given to establishing legal recogni-
tion of the customary or traditional land tenure systems of affected in-
digenous peoples or granting them long-term renewable rights of
custodianship and use. 237
236. See ERICA-IRENE A. DAES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO LAND (U.N. 1999) (analyzing the problems affecting indigenous
land rights).
237. OP 4.10, supra note 37, paras. 12,13.
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While these paragraphs note the cultural significance of indige-
nous lands, territories, and resources, very little is required with re-
spect to the recognition of and respect for indigenous rights over
them and the policy fails to require in any way that indigenous own-
ership rights be recognized and respected. They simply require that
the Borrower "takes into account" indigenous individual and collec-
tive rights, that the Borrower "gives particular attention to" indige-
nous rights, and, with a view to the Borrower's legislation, "that con-
sideration is given to establishing legal recognition of the customary
or traditional land tenure systems of affected indigenous peoples or
granting them long-term renewable rights of custodianship and
use."
238
The indigenous rights referred to are the "individual and collective
rights to use and develop the lands that they occupy." '2 39 Use and de-
velopment of lands may be incidents of ownership, but they are not
equivalent; ownership amounts to control, although not necessarily
absolute control, over a thing. In practice, should the state be op-
posed to recognition of indigenous ownership rights, it need not do
so and may implement a variety of projects in violation of indige-
nous rights.
International law, on the other hand, requires that indigenous peo-
ples' ownership and other rights to their lands, territories and re-
sources be legally recognized and respected, which includes titling,
demarcation, and ensuring their integrity. These rights are protected
under international law in connection with a variety of other rights,
including the general prohibition of racial discrimination, the right to
property, and the right to cultural integrity as part and parcel of the
right to self determination.
That the right to self-determination applies to indigenous peoples
is clear from the observations of the U.N. Human Rights Committee
("HRC"), the body charged with monitoring state compliance with
the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR").24 ° In its Concluding Observations on Canada's fourth pe-
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.,
art. 3 [hereinafter U.N. Draft Declaration] ("Indigenous peoples have the right to
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riodic report, the HRC stated that:
With reference to the conclusion by the [Royal Commission on Aborigi-
nal Peoples] that without a greater share of lands and resources institu-
tions of aboriginal self-government will fail. the Committee emphasizes
that the right to self-determination requires, inter alia, that all peoples
must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and
that they may not be deprived of their own means of subsistence (article
1(2)). The Committee recommends that decisive and urgent action be
taken towards the full implementation of the RCAP recommendations on
land and resource allocation. The Committee also recommends that the
practice of extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights be abandoned as in-
compatible with article I of the Covenant.
2 41
The HRC reached similar conclusions-that the State should im-
plement and respect the right of Indigenous peoples to self-
determination, particularly in connection with their traditional
lands-in its Concluding Observations on the reports of Mexico and
Norway issued in 1999 and Australia in 2000.22 In its complaints-
self determination. This means they can freely determine their political status and
identity and pursue their own economic, social and cultural development."), avail-
able at http:www.usak.ca/nativelaw/ddirplaint.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2001). The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recognized some measure of this
right in its proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(1997), art. XV(1) when they acknowledged that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and accord-
ingly, they have the right to autonomy and self-government with regard to
inter alia culture, religion, education, information, media, health, housing,
employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resource manage-
ment, the environment and entry by non-members, and to the ways and means
for financing these autonomous functions.
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. xv( I)
(Feb. 26, 1997), available at http://www.cidh.oas.ore/indigenous.htm.
241. Consideration of Reports Submitted bv States Parties Under Article 40 of
the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee. Canada,
U.N. Human Rights Committee, 65th Sess., para. 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 (1999).
242. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee. Mex-
ico, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 66th Sess., para. 19, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.109 (1999) (concluding that the State should take action to pro-
tect the rights of indigenous peoples); see also Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant. Conchiding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee, Norway, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 67th
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based jurisprudence, the HRC also relates the right to self-
determination to the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their culture
under Article 27 of the ICCPR. 243
The right of all peoples to self-determination has both procedural
(determining political status and pursuing economic, social, and cul-
tural development and the right to give or withhold consent) and sub-
stantive aspects (inter alia, the right to autonomous, self-government
and the right to ownership of and control over lands, territories, and
resources).2 44 Self-determination has been described as "a funda-
mental human right the enjoyment of which is an essential precondi-
tion for the enjoyment of any other human rights and fundamental
freedoms." '45 Self-determination is thus of a much wider scope than
Sess., paras. 10, 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.112 (1999) (noting positive
changes in the treatment of the Sami, Indigenous people relating to language, cul-
tural institutions, and legal disputes over land); see also Consideration of'Reports
Submitted Under Article 40, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, Australia, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 69th Sess., sec. 3, paras. 498-
528, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (2000) (finding that the State must take further actions to
protect the titles and interest of the indigenous people in their land).
243. See Views of the Human Rights Committee Under Article 5. Paragraph 4.
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Communication No. 547/1993, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 70th Sess.,
para. 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/701D/547/1993 (2000) ("[T]he provisions of article I
[the right to self-determination] may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights
protected by the Covenant, in particular article 27...").
244. See Explanatory Note Concerning the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples by Erica-Irene A. Daes, Chairperson of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 45th Sess., at 4-5,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/Add.1 (1993) (explaining that self-determination in
the draft Declaration requires that indigenous peoples exercise their right to self-
determination through the states' political and legal systems unless those systems
are "so exclusive and non-democratic that [they] can no longer be said to be repre-
senting the whole people"). States have a corresponding duty to adopt legal, ad-
ministrative, and constitutional reforms that recognize the rights of indigenous
peoples to, among other things, autonomy, self-government, territory, cultural in-
tegrity and participation based upon consent. Id. Secession is only possible as an
exceptional measure should the state fail to accommodate these rights and be so
abusive and unrepresentative "that the situation is tantamount to classic colonial-
ism." Id. Erica-Irene Daes is the former Chair of the U.N. Working Group on In-
digenous Populations and one of the principle architects of the U.N. Draft Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
245. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Working
Group on Indigenous Population on its tenth session, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, 44th Sess., para. 71, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33 (1992) (adding that
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just indigenous territorial rights; it provides the framework for the
exercise of all other rights and is viewed by indigenous peoples and
others as essential to their cultural survival and future develop-
ment.246 The ICJ,247 most scholars, 248 and a major U.N. study" 9 con-
clude that the right to self-determination is a peremptory norm of in-
ternational law or jus cogens, and therefore, non-derogable. The
extent to which thejus cogens aspects of the right apply beyond clas-
sic (geographically separate) colonial situations, however, is ques-
tionable.
denying these rights can lead to dangerous conflicts); see also Hector Gros Espiell,
Implementation of United Nations Resolutions Relating to the Rights of Peoples
under Colonial and Alien Domination to Self-Determination, U.N. Commission on
Human Rights, 31st Sess., para. 50, U.N. Doc E/Cn.4/Sub.2/405 (1978) (stating
that it has been affirmed by many documents that self-determination is a right of
all peoples).
246. See generally ANAYA, supra note 26 (elaborating on the affect of self-
determination on international law); S. James Anaya, A Contemporary Definition
of the International Norin of Self-Determination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 131, 147 (1993) (explaining that the world has rejected the idea of a gov-
ernment imposing its ideas and policies on a people regardless of their position in
society); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to
Subject of International Law, 7 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 33 (1994) (showing that there
are still many interpretations to self-determination including democratic rights and
the right to secession); Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determrination, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1 (1993) (arguing that the right of self-determination "should ordinarily be inter-
preted as the right of these peoples to negotiate freely their political status and rep-
resentation in the States in which they live."); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters
on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of In-
digenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660 (1990) (explaining
the development of the rights of self-determination to include the rights of indige-
nous people to maintain their autonomous culture).
247. See generally East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 102 (June 30) (stat-
ing that the right of self-determination is one of the "essential principles of con-
temporary international law"), at http:/ www.icj-cij.orgi icjwww/ idecisions/
isummaries/ipastsummary950630.htm.
248. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 68, at 513; Karen Parker & Lyn Beth
Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTNGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 411, 440 (1989) (arguing that self-determination is a jus cogens
norm for several reasons including the fact that it the first right mentioned in two
important treaties).
249. See Espiell, supra note 245, para. 75 (noting that the idea that self-
determination is a jus cogens norm is supported by many).
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Inter-governmental agencies have, a number of times, addressed
indigenous rights to lands, territories, and resources under human
rights instruments of general application. For example, under Article
5 of the CERD, for instance, states-parties are obligated to recognize,
respect and guarantee the right "to own property alone as well as in
association with others" and the right to inherit property, without
discrimination. 2 0 Failure to recognize and protect indigenous prop-
erty ownership and inheritance systems and rights is discriminatory
and denies equal protection of the law.
In its 1997 General Recommendation, the U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination elaborates on state obligations
and indigenous rights under CERD. 5 In particular, the Committee
called upon states-parties to "recognize and protect the rights of in-
digenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal
lands, territories and resources and, where they have been deprived
of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhab-
ited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to
return these lands and territories. 252
As discussed above, the prohibition of racial discrimination has
acquired the status of a non-derogable, peremptory norm of interna-
tional law and as one of the obligations erga omnes, and, as such, is
binding on the Bank.253 CERD may be taken as an elaboration of the
content and various aspects of the peremptory norm prohibiting ra-
cial discrimination. At a minimum, provisions of the Convention,
and interpretations thereof, inform the nature and content of Bank
obligations under the general norm. Aside from this, the principal
provisions of CERD are declaratory of customary international law
250. See Press Release, United Nations, HR/4487 (July, 27 2000) (stating that
one hundred and fifty-six States have ratified CERD as of July 2000), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet (last visited Novem-
ber 6, 2001 ).
251. See General Recommendation XXIII Concerning Indigenous Peoples. 51 st
Sess., 1235 mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/51/Misc.13/Rev.4 (1997) [hereinafter
Gen. Rec. XXIII] (calling on states to eliminate discrimination against indigenous
peoples).
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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obliging the Bank to act consistently therewith. " Also, over three-
quarters of the Bank's membership has ratified CERD, obliging the
Bank to account for and respect their attendant obligations. '
Article 27 of the ICCPR, provides that: "In those States in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of the group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. -56 This
article protects linguistic, cultural, and religious rights, and, in the
case of indigenous peoples, includes, among others, land and re-
source, subsistence, and participation rights. '57 These rights are held
by individuals, but exercised "in community with other members of
the group," thereby providing some measure of collectivity. 2"5 Simi-
lar language is found in article 30 of the U.N. Convention on the
254. See MERON, supra note 151, at 21 (arguing that the Convention does not
preclude reservations that may be contrary to the purpose of the Convention).
255. See Press Release, supra note 250 (displaying the signatories of the
CERD).
256. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 27
[hereinafter International Covenant]. available at http:// www.unhchr.ch html/
menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
257. See Chief Bernard Oninayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Re-
port of the Hunan Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 38th Sess.,
Supp. No. 43, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/45140 vol.2 (1990) [hereinafter Oinnavak] (de-
termining that Lake Lubicon Cree had been denied their culture due to environ-
mental degradation and failure to protect the cultural relationship with their lands
and resources); see also Jouni Lansman v. Finland, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 58th Sess., Communication No. 671/1995 at 13, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1995) [hereinafter J. Lansinan] (finding that reindeer
herding fit into the definition of cultural activities); lhnari Lansinan v. Finland,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52nd Sess., Communications No. 511/1992 at 11,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/521D/51 1/1992 (1992) [hereinafter 1. Lansman] (finding that
limited quarrying on the slopes of one mountain did not deny the fight to culture);
Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at
229, U.N. Doc. A/43/40 (1988) (finding that indigenous peoples' subsistence rights
are protected by article 27); Lovelace i. Canada. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 173-4, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981) [hereinafter Love-
lace] (finding that preventing a woman from moving back to the reservation inter-
fered with her right to enjoy her own culture); Hopu v. France, U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 60th Sess., Communications No. 549/1993 at 15, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/601D/549/1993/Rev.1 (1997) (holding, not under Article 27, that destruc-
tion of an ancestral burial ground violated the rights to privacy and family life).
258. International Covenant, supra note 256.
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Rights of the Child, therefore, the points made here are also relevant
to the rights of indigenous children, and, by implication, the larger
community, under that instrument. 259 Article 30 of the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child and ICCPR article 27 embody one
manifestation of the general norm of international law relating to the
right to cultural integrity.260
The HRC interprets Article 27 to include the "rights of persons, in
community with others, to engage in economic and social activities
which are part of the culture of the community to which they be-
long." In reaching this conclusion, the HRC recognizes that indige-
nous peoples' subsistence and other traditional economic activities
are an integral part of their culture, and interference with those ac-
tivities can be detrimental to their cultural integrity and survival. By
necessity, the land, resource base, and the environment thereof also
require protection if subsistence activities are to be safeguarded.
The HRC further elaborates upon its interpretation of Article 27 by
stating that:
[O]ne or other aspects of the rights of individuals protected [under Art.
27]-for example to enjoy a particular culture-may consist in a way of
life which is closely associated with a territory and its use of resources.
This may particularly be true of members of indigenous communities
constituting a minority .... With regard to the exercise of the cultural
rights protected under Article 27, the committee observes that culture
manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associ-
ated with the use of land resources, specifically in the case of indigenous
peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or
hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment
of those rights may require positive legal measures of protection and
measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority
communities in decisions which affect them .... The Committee con-
cludes that Article 27 relates to rights whose protection imposes specific
259. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 30, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/44/25 [hereinafter CRC]. One hundred and ninety-one States have ratified
the CRC.
260. See Lyndel V. Prott, Cultural Rights as Peoples' Rights in International
Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 93 (James Crawford ed., 1988) (asserting defini-
tions of cultural rights in international law); S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights
Norms in Contemporay International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 15
(1991) (discussing new international laws giving indigenous people better hopes
for survival).
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obligations on States parties. The protection of these rights is directed to
ensure the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious
and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric
of society as a whole.
261
In July 2000, the HRC added that Article 27 requires that "neces-
sary steps should be taken to restore and protect the titles and inter-
ests of indigenous persons in their native lands" and that "securing
continuation and sustainability of traditional forms of economy of
indigenous minorities (hunting, fishing and gathering), and protec-
tion of sites of religious or cultural significance for such minori-
ties... must be protected under Article 27. ' '26-
Although the HRC has observed that a State's freedom to encour-
age economic development is limited by the obligations it has as-
sumed under Article 27, the rights the article guarantees are not ab-
solute.2 63 The HRC employs a threshold test to determine if the
complained of activity constitutes a denial of the rights protected or
merely an infringement of those rights."6 This test has important im-
plications for Bank projects as it relates to the obligations of the
Bank's Members, as well as obligations of the Bank separately and
in connection with obligations of its Members. An activity that
amounts to a denial of the right to enjoy cultures-for indigenous
peoples this includes land, subsistence, and other rights-is prohib-
ited under Article 27 as well as under the norm of customary inter-
national law manifested therein. Such activities include forcible relo-
cation, severe environmental degradation, and denial of access to
subsistence areas and areas of cultural and religious significance. 261
261. See General Recommendation XXIII Concerning the Rights of Minorities,
50th Sess., 1314 mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2 I/Rev. l/Add.5 (1994) (commenting on
rights of minorities under Article 27).
262. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Australia,
paras. 10-11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/69/AUS (2000).
263. See L Lansman, supra note 257, at 10 (reiterating that interference with
cultural rights is not a violation of Article 27 unless that interference denies the ex-
ercise of those rights).
264. See id. (finding that measures impacting the way one lives might not deny
rights under Article 27).
265. See supra note 257 and accompanying text (describing the types of activi-
ties that amount to a denial of the right to enjoy culture for indigenous peoples).
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However, the fact that an activity does not amount to a denial of the
right to enjoy culture does not mean that it may not violate a specific
cultural right, for instance, the right to use and practice indigenous
medicine. Such a right may be violated by denying indigenous peo-
ple access to areas where certain medicinal plants are exclusively lo-
cated.
Under Inter-American human rights instruments, specifically the
American Convention on Human Rights, the OAS has reached simi-
lar conclusions about indigenous peoples' rights.266 First, it is well
established in the Inter-American system that indigenous peoples
have been historically discriminated against and disadvantaged and,
therefore, that special measures and protections (affirmative action)
are required if they are to enjoy equal protection of the law and the
full enjoyment of other human rights. These special measures include
protections for indigenous languages, cultures, economies, ecosys-
tems and natural resource base, religious practices, "ancestral and
communal lands," and the establishment of an institutional order that
facilitates indigenous participation through their freely chosen repre-
sentatives.2 67 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
("IACHR") characterizes the preceding as "human rights also essen-
tial to the right to life of peoples.2 68 In the negative, protection of
these rights amounts to a broad prohibition of forcible assimilation
and ethnocide.
According to the IACHR, indigenous peoples' property rights, in-
cluding ownership, derive from their own forms of land tenure, tra-
ditional occupation, and use, and exist absent formal recognition by
the state.2 69 This is consistent with aboriginal title jurisprudence in
266. See generally American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969.
267. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ectador, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Ecuador Reportl
(discussing special protections for indigenous lands, economies and cultures in
light of petroleum drilling and environmental degradation); Third Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in The Republic of Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEAISer.1/V/II.67, doc. 9 (1986) [hereinafter Guatemala Report]; Report on the
Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of 'Miskito
Origin, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (1983) [hercinafter
Miskito Report] (showing why the Miskito people deserves special protection).
268. Guatemala Report, supra note 267.
269. See Case 11.577, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev.
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most common law states270 and with international instruments in
general. The IACHR has related territorial rights on a number of oc-
casions to cultural integrity, thereby recognizing the fundamental
connection between indigenous land tenure and resource security and
the right to practice, develop, and transmit culture free from unwar-
ranted interference. 7' In 1997, for instance, the IACHR stated that:
For many indigenous cultures, continued utilization of traditional collec-
tive systems for the control and use of territory are essential to their sur-
vival, as well as to their individual and collective well-being. Control over
the land refers to both its capacity for providing the resources which sus-
tain life, and to "the geographical space necessary for the cultural and so-
cial reproduction of the group."
272
The IACHR reiterates this conclusion in its Second Report on the
Human Rights Situation in Peru, stating that "Land, for the indige-
nous peoples, is a condition of individual security and liaison with
the group. The recovery, recognition, demarcation, and registration
of the lands represents essential rights for cultural survival and for
maintaining the community's integrity. 2' -73 As noted above, the right
to cultural integrity is a norm of customary international law binding
on the Bank.
International Labor Organization Convention Number 169 ("ILO
169") contains a number of provisions on indigenous territorial
rights. 274 Article 13(1) frames the provisions that require govern-
(1999); see also PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES art. XVIII [hereinafter PROPOSED AMERICAN
DECLARATION]. The IACHR approved this declaration in 1997.
270. See Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Cl. Ct. 487, 492 (1967) (re-
versing decision to dismiss claims against U.S. by Indian tribes in Texas); Roberts
v. Canada [1989] S.C.R. 322, 340 (Can.): Wik Peoples v. Queensland & Ors.
(1996) 187 C.L.R. 1, 84 (Austl.) (1996).
271. See Ecuador Report, supra note 267 (finding special relevance to indige-
nous inhabitants of Ecuador).
272. Id.
273. Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Pent, Inter. Am. C.H.R.
at Ch. X, par. 16, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 (2000); see also Third Report on
the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, Inter. Am. C.H.R. at Ch. IX, para. 47,
OEA/Ser.LiV/II.1 10 doc. 52 (2001).
274. See International Labour Organisation Convention C169, (June 27, 1989)
[hereinafter ILO 169] (setting forth the rights that attach to indigenous territorial
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ments to recognize and respect the special spiritual, cultural, and
economic relationship that indigenous people have with their lands
and territories, especially "the collective aspects of this relation-
ship. 275 Article 14 requires that indigenous peoples' collective
"rights of ownership and possession ... over the lands which they
traditionally occupy shall be recognized" and that "[g]ovemments
shall take steps as necessary to identify" these lands and to "guaran-
tee effective protection of [Indigenous peoples'] rights of ownership
and possession. '276 Article 13(2) defines the term "lands" to include
"the concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the
areas which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use. "277
The preceding provisions on land rights must all be read in con-
nection with Article 7(1) of the Convention which provides that:
ownership), available at http://www.ilo.org. As of November 2001 the following
14 states have ratified: Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecua-
dor, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, and
Peru. Id. Austria and Venezuela have ratified, but have yet to transmit their instru-
ment of ratification to the ILO. Id. The following states have submitted it to their
national legislatures for ratification or are discussing ratification: Brazil, Chile, the
Philippines, Finland, El Salvador, Russian Federation, Panama, and Sri Lanka. Id.
Germany has adopted ILO 169 as the basis for its overseas development aid and
the Asian Development Bank and the U.N.DP have incorporated some of its sub-
stance into their policies on indigenous peoples (draft policy in the case of'
U.N.DP). See e.g., Asian Development Bank, The Bank ' Policy on Indigenous
Peoples (1999).
275. ILO 169, supra note 274, art. 13.
276. Id. art. 14. For ILO jurisprudence on Convention 169's land and other pro-
visions, see e.g., Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the Representation
Alleging Non-observance by Denmark of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Con-
vention, doc. GB.277/18/3 (2000) (considering action by relocated persons claim-
ing damages); Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the Representation Al-
leging Non-observance by Bolivia of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention, doc. GB.272/8/1 (1998) (noting exploitation of indigenous peoples'
lands by forestry industry); Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the Repre-
sentation Alleging Non-observance by Peru of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention, doc. GB.270/16/4 (1997) (noting special importance of cultures of
peoples concerned with their interaction with lands and territories); Report of the
Committee Set Up to Examine the Representation Alleging Non-observance by
Mexico of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, doc. GB.270/16/3
(1996) (urging the safeguard of land not exclusively occupied by indigenous peo-
ples).
277. See ILO 169, supra note 274 (defining crucial terms).
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The people concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities
for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions
and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and
to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social
and cultural development.
278
Several provisions determine the scope of the internal autonomy.
Among those provisions are: the provisions on health services (Arti-
cle 25(1) - "adequate health services.. .under their own responsibil-
ity and control"); education (Article 27(2)(3) - "[t]he competent
authority shall ensure the training of members ... with a view to the
progressive transfer of responsibility for conduct of [educational
programs]" and "the right of these peoples to establish their own
educational institutions"); vocational training (Article 22(3) - "these
peoples shall progressively assume responsibility for the organiza-
tion and operation of such special training programs"); and espe-
cially to those concerning lands and territories (Article 13-19) and
Indigenous institutions (Articles 7(1), 8(2) and 9).27'
ILO 169's predecessor, ILO 107, adopted in 1957, also provides
that "[t]he right of ownership, collective or individual, of the mem-
bers of the population concerned over the lands which these popula-
tions traditionally occupy shall be recognized." ' In interpreting this
article in a complaint involving tribal people in India, the ILO com-
mittee of experts held that the rights that attach under Article 11 also
apply to lands presently occupied, irrespective of immemorial pos-
session or occupation. 8 1 India unsuccessfully argued that the phrase
"traditionally occupy" limits compensable land rights to groups
which can demonstrate immemorial possession.-"' The ILO Com-
mittee stated that because the people had some form of relationship
with land presently occupied, even if only for a short time, this rela-
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. International Labour Organisation Convention C107, Indigenous and Tribal
Population Convention, June 26, 1957. art. 11, available at
http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/scripts/ [hereinafter ILO 107].
281. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Con ventions and
Recommendations, Report III(4A), at 287, International Labour Conference, Sess.
75, Geneva 1988.
282. Id.
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tionship was sufficient to form an interest and, therefore, rights to
that land and the attendant resources."' Twenty-seven States have
ratified ILO, many of them in Asia and Africa, including Brazil and
India, two of the Bank's major borrowers.284
Article 14 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
guarantees property rights, while Articles 3 and 19 guarantee equal
protection of the law for individuals and peoples and Article 2 pro-
hibits discrimination.285 Relying on U.N. and IACHR jurisprudence,
these provisions read together amount to a recognition of indigenous
property rights based upon traditional occupation and use.2"6
Articles 19 through 24 of the African Charter set out the rights of
peoples, including the right to self-determination, the right to freely
dispose of natural wealth, and the right to a satisfactory environ-
ment.287 There is little clarity, however, about who are the holders of
peoples' rights, especially whether sub-state entities such as indige-
nous peoples are beneficiaries. In some cases, the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples' Rights has found that peoples' rights
only attach to the entire population of independent states, in others,
to sub-state entities within those independent states." 8 The African
Commission recently established a Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples with a mandate to assess indigenous rights in relation to the
right to self-determination and other rights which may provide fur-
ther guidance on this issue.28 9
283. Id.
284. ILO 107, supra note 280.
285. See AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS arts. 2, 3, 14, 19
(guaranteeing the specified rights).
286. See id. (incorporating property rights and equal protection into the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights).
287. See id. arts. 19-24.
288. Compare Resolution on the Situation in Rwanda: Seventh Activiity Report of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples'Rights. ACH PR/APT/7th, Annex
XII, para. 2 (referring to "all the Peoples of Rwanda when calling for special at-
tention to Rwanda's human rights situation") with Richard N. Kiwanuka, The
Meaning of "People" in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1988) (arguing that the definition of "people" as used in the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is contrary to one of popular sov-
ereignty).
289. See African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Resolution on the
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Recent normative developments relating to indigenous lands, ter-
ritories, and resources are expansive, requiring legal recognition,
restitution, and compensation; protection of the total environment
thereof; and various measures of participation in extra-territorial ac-
tivities that may affect subsistence rights and environmental and
cultural integrity.290 Article 26 of the U.N. Draft Declaration, for in-
stance, provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the
lands and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air,
waters, coastal sea, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources which
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. This in-
cludes the right to the full recognition of their laws and customs, land-
tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of
resources, and the right to effective measures by states to prevent any in-
terference with, alienation or encroachment upon these rights.
291
The OAS Proposed Declaration also provides a substantial meas-
ure of protection. Article XVIII states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the legal recognition of the various
and specific forms of control, ownership and enjoyment of territories and
property.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition of their property
and ownership fights with respect to lands, territories, and resources they
have historically occupied, as well as to the use of those to which they
have historically had access for their traditional activities and livelihood.
Rights of Indigenous People/Cominitnities in Africa, (2000) (on file with author).
The mandate of the Working Group is described in the resolution as to:
examine the concept of indigenous people and communities in Africa; study
the implications of the African Charter on Human Rights and well being of
indigenous communities especially with regard to: the right to equality (arti-
cles 2 and 3) the right to dignity (article 5) protection against domination (ar-
ticle 19) on self-determination (article 20) and the promotion of cultural de-
velopment and identity (article 22); [and to] consider appropriate
recommendations for the monitoring and protection of the rights of indige-
nous communities.
Id.
290. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 240 (setting standards for indige-
nous peoples' rights, including the right to self-determination, protection of territo-
rial rights and subsistence rights).
291. Id. art. 26.
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3. Where property and user rights of indigenous peoples arise from rights
existing prior to the creation of those states, the states shall recognize the
titles of indigenous peoples relative thereto as permanent, exclusive, in-
alienable, imprescriptible and indefeasible.[This shall not limit] the right
of indigenous peoples to attribute ownership within the community in ac-
cordance with their customs, traditions, uses and traditional practices, nor
shall it affect any collective community rights over them.
4. Indigenous peoples have the right to an effective legal framework for
the protection of their rights with respect to the natural resources on their
lands, including the ability to use, manage, and conserve such re-
sources.
2 92
As evident from the preceding, human rights standards, as set out
in treaties, in jurisprudence interpreting those treaties, and in emerg-
ing standards, all require that countries recognize and respect indige-
nous ownership rights, at a minimum, over lands traditionally occu-
pied. All that OP 4.10 requires is that Borrowers consider doing so. '
This discretion is clear from paragraph 20, which permits the Bank to
provide technical assistance, "[a]t the Borrower's request," to "es-
tablish legal recognition of the customary or traditional land tenure
systems of indigenous peoples, or grant long-term renewable rights
of custodianship and use. ' 294 This is not only inconsistent with hu-
man rights standards, it is also entirely inconsistent with the Bank's
views on the centrality of property rights to overall development and
poverty alleviation efforts.295 On these grounds alone, it is difficult to
see how the Bank can justify this approach.
OP 4.10 paragraphs 12 and 13 may not even comply with the
Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), a binding international
environmental treaty.296 As noted above, two Bank policies (Forests
292. PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION, supra note 269.
293. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, I)RAIrr
OPERATIONAL POLICIES (OP 4.10), para. 9 (Mar. 23, 2001) [hereinafter DRAFT OP
4.10] (outlining regulations for consultation and participation), available at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/28354584d9d97c29852567cc00780e2
a/fe699bec4e64al ef85256a6b0080b5d7?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 10,
2001).
294. Id. para. 20.
295. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (detailing the role of social
development).
296. Compare DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, with Convention on Biological
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and Environmental Assessment) require that the Bank not finance
projects that contravene their Members' obligations under interna-
tional environmental treaties. 297 Footnote one to OP 4.10 states that it
should be read together with other relevant Bank policies and spe-
cifically mentions the policies on Forests and Environmental As-
sessment, as well as OP 4.04 on Natural Habitats discussed below.2-8
Article 10(c) of the CBD provides that States shall "protect and
encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or
sustainable use requirements. ' 299 Although the precise scope and
meaning of this article has yet to be formally articulated, it will most
likely include indigenous agriculture, agro-forestry, hunting, fishing,
gathering and use of medicinal plants and other subsistence activi-
ties. This article, by implication, should also be read to include a
certain measure of protection for the ecosystem and environment in
which those resources are found. The analyses of the Secretariat of
the CBD supports these observations on Article 10(c). In "Tradi-
tional Knowledge and Biological Diversity," the Secretariat said the
following about the language "protect and encourage" found in
10(c):
In order to protect and encourage, the necessary conditions may be in
place, namely, security of tenure over traditional terrestrial and marine
estates; control over and use of traditional natural resources; and respect
for the heritage, languages and cultures of indigenous and local commu-
nities, best evidenced by appropriate legislative protection (which in-
cludes protection of intellectual property, sacred places, and so on). Dis-
cussions on these issues in other United Nations forums have also dealt
with the issue of respect for the right to self-determination, which is often
interpreted to mean the exercise of self-government 30U
Diversity (June 5, 1992), available at http://vww.biodiv.org/doc/legaltcbd-en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
297. See supra notes 102 and 203 (setting forth the requirement to avoid conflict
with members' responsibilities under international law and environmental agree-
ments).
298. See DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, at n. 1.
299. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 10(c) (June 5, 1992), available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
300. Traditional Knowledge and Biological Diversity. U.N.EP/CB D/TKBD/ 1/2,
at 23 (1997).
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Finally, Anaya and Williams state that "the relevant practice of
states and international institutions establishes that, as a matter of
customary international law, states must recognize and protect in-
digenous peoples' rights to land and natural resources in connection
with traditional or ancestral use and occupancy patterns."' ""' These
land and resource rights include ownership rights. While there is no
authoritative judicial or quasi-judicial confirmation of this conclu-
sion,302 a very persuasive case can be made in support of it, espe-
cially if one also views state practice in the context of their interna-
tional statements and conduct. Moreover, Anaya and Williams are
not alone among scholars in reaching this conclusion."" Should rec-
ognition and respect of indigenous land and resource rights be con-
firmed as part of customary international law in their own right, the
Bank will be bound to respect these rights. As it stands now, custom-
ary international law protects these rights in connection with the
principal provisions of CERD.
2. Consent, Participation, and Consultation
OP 4.10 employs the terms, "consultation", "meaningful consulta-
tion," involvement, and, in one place, agreement, the latter signifying
consent.3"4 These terms are scattered throughout the text and appear
to be used inconsistently so that it is difficult to ascertain with any
certainty which standard is to be used in what context. 05 Paragraph
301. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-A/nerican
Human Rights Systen, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 55 (2001) (arguing that tile In-
ter-American human rights system protects lands and resources of indigenous peo-
ples).
302. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights made this argument in
a case recently decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See May-
agna Awas Tingni Community Case, Inter-American Court on Human Rights. Se-
ries C. No. 79. Judgment of 31 August 2001, available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriec/Sentencia.html. The Court, however, did not ad-
dress this issue in its judgment, but based protection of indigenous land rights on
Articles 1, 2, and 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights read in con-
junction with United Nations instruments protecting indigenous rights. Id. para.
141.
303. See sutpra note 26 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, paras. 8-10, 16.
305. See id.
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7, for instance, provides that Bank-assisted operations require
"[m]eaningful consultation" and mechanisms "to foster the informed
participation" of indigenous peoples.3) 6 Paragraph 9, entitled "Con-
sultation and Participation" mentions only "meaningful consultation"
and "consultation.""3 7 Further, paragraph 10 specifies that projects,
either identified as having adverse effects or specially designed to
benefit indigenous peoples, require "informed participation," how-
ever, its sub-paragraphs detailing processing requirements simply re-
quire that activities be undertaken "in consultation" with indigenous
peoples.30 8 For potentially damaging resource exploitation opera-
tions, the OP requires consultation and that indigenous peoples be
involved in decision making; 30 9 for activities pertaining to parks and
protected areas affecting customary usufruct rights, informed partici-
pation is required;31 0 and, for exploitation of cultural resources, con-
sent is required.31'
Irrespective of which standard applies, pursuant to paragraph 9,
the Borrower merely "considers the views and preferences of indige-
nous peoples" when deciding to move ahead with the project and in
determining if any project modifications are necessary."' The Bank
then has the dubious task of determining if the Borrower's judgment
is consistent with the policy as a whole."'
Rather than examine each of the paragraphs mentioned above, I
will confine my comments to paragraph 14. As with the paragraphs
discussed in the preceding section, paragraph 14 also falls short of
human rights standards. It reads:
Commercial Use of Lands and Resources. When Bank-assisted projects
involve the commercial exploitation of natural resources (including for-
ests, mineral, and hydrocarbon resources) on lands owned, or customarily
used by indigenous groups, the Borrower:
306. Id. para. 7 (outlining policy regulations).
307. Id. para. 7 (outlining policy regulations).
308. Id. para. 10 (dealing with project design).
309. Id. para. 14 (dealing with commercial use and resources).
310. DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, para. 15.
311. Id. para. 16.
312. Id. para. 9.
313. Id.
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(a) informs these groups of their rights to such resources under statutory
and customary law;
(b) informs them of the potential impacts of such projects on their liveli-
hoods, environments and use of natural resources;
(c) consults them at an early stage on the development of the project, and
involves them in decisions which affect them; and
(d) provides them with opportunities to derive benefits from the project.
As in all projects which affect indigenous groups, adverse impacts upon
them are avoided or minimized, and benefits should be culturally appro-
priate.3
14
Paragraph 14 defines procedural mechanisms the Bank will em-
ploy when financing resource exploitation on indigenous lands, in
this case defined as lands both owned and customarily used."' 5 I will
focus here only on sub-paragraph (c), except to say that sub-
paragraph (d) is substandard as international standards require that
indigenous peoples share in benefits derived from exploitation of re-
sources pertaining to their lands and that compensation be rendered
for any related damages.3 16 The OP requires neither, although com-
pensation may be provided for under domestic law and procedures.
Sub-paragraph (c) requires that consultation take place "at an early
stage" in project development and that indigenous peoples be in-
volved in decision-making. 317 Apart from it being unclear when ex-
actly is "an early stage" of the project and why consultation should
not take place from inception, consulting with and involving indige-
nous peoples is clearly substandard. Different human rights instru-
ments and bodies have employed different standards." 8 These stan-
dards range from free and informed consent to effective, meaningful,
or informed participation to good faith consultation aimed at
314. Id. para. 14.
315. DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, para. 14.
316. See ILO 169, supra note 274, art. 15(2) (requiring either participation in or
compensation for use of mineral or sub-surface resources); PROPOSED AMERICAN
DECLARATION, supra note 269, art. XVIII(5) (requiring compensation for exploi-
tation of minerals and subsoil resources).
317. DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, para. 14(c).
318. Compare id. with ILO 169, supra note 274 (demonstrating the different
standards employed by the two instruments).
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achieving agreement or consent.1 9 Regardless, they all surpass the
standard set in the OP.
The 1997 General Recommendation, issued by the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for instance, called upon
states-parties to "ensure that members of indigenous peoples have
equal rights in respect of effective participation in public life, and
that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are
taken without their informed consent." 20 The Committee later rec-
ognized indigenous peoples' right to "effective participation... in
decisions affecting their land rights, as required under article 5(c) of
the Convention and General Recommendation XXIII of the Commit-
tee, which stresses the importance of ensuring the 'informed consent'
of indigenous peoples."3 2 Article 30 of the U.N. Draft Declaration is
consistent with this:
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands, territories and other
resources, including the right to require that states obtain their free and in-
formed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands,
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the devel-
opment, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.322
Similarly, finding that Nicaragua violated the right to property, ju-
dicial protection, and due process by granting logging concessions on
indigenous lands without taking steps to title and demarcate those
lands, the IACHR held that:
The State of Nicaragua is responsible for violations of the right to prop-
erty, embodied in Article 21, by granting a concession to SOLCARSA to
carry out road construction work and logging exploitation on the Awas
Tingni lands, without the consent of the Awas Tingni Community. 32 3
319. Id.
320. Gen. Rec. XXII, supra note 251, at I (calling for elimination of discrimi-
nation against indigenous peoples).
321. Concluding Observations by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Australia, 56th Sess., para. 9, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.I0
(2000) (expressing concern for indigenous peoples of Australia whose protection
might be reduced)(emphasis added).
322. U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 240.
323. Judgement on the Prelininar
, 
Objections of February 1, 2000, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., report no. 27/98, Ser. C no. 66 (2000).
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While not requiring consent, ILO 169 requires that the state "es-
tablish or maintain procedures through which [it] shall consult these
peoples" to determine the extent to which "their interests would be
prejudiced" prior to engaging in, or allowing, resource exploita-
tion.3 24 This provision should be read consistently with the general
requirement of Article 6(2) that consultation be undertaken "in good
faith and in a form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objec-
tive of achieving agreement or consent. 325 Article XVIII(5) of the
Proposed OAS Declaration provides that states "must establish or
maintain procedures for the participation of the peoples concerned in
determining whether the interests of these peoples would be ad-
versely affected and to what extent, before undertaking or authoriz-
ing" operations on indigenous lands.32 6 Also, the HRC has found that
respect for Article 27 of the ICCPR includes "measures to ensure the
effective participation of members of minority communities in deci-
sions which affect them. 327
To be consistent, the OP must, at a minimum, require indigenous
peoples' effective or meaningful participation. Furthermore, as inter-
pretations of CERD carry additional weight, given the status attrib-
uted to the norm prohibiting racial discrimination, the policy should
comply with the standard set by the Committee: ensuring effective
participation and informed consent. Inclusion of such a low standard
is extremely disturbing given the history of severe problems that in-
digenous peoples have experienced with resource exploitation.12 1 It is
no coincidence that the majority of complaints filed by indigenous
peoples with intergovernmental human rights bodies concern the
negative impact of these activities and attendant human rights viola-
324. See ILO 169, supra note 274, art. 15(2) (requiring either participation in or
compensation for use of mineral or sub-surface resources).
325. Id. art. 6(2) (requiring good faith for consultations regarding application of'
Convention).
326. PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION, supra note 269, art. XXVIII(5).
327. General Comment No. 23 (50) art. 27, at 4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994) (calling for protection of the participation of mi-
norities in community activities). See also L Lansman, supra note 257.
328. See Gen. Rec. XXIII, supra note 251 (finding the need to remedy past and
continuing discrimination against indigenous peoples).
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tions.3 29 The Bank must require a strong, effective, and verifiable
participation/consent standard, especially given its failure in the past
to ensure that participation did in fact occur-recall the internal Bank
study noted above that found that only half of Bank projects between
1992-97 involved consultation with indigenous authorities about
project design and implementation. 30
Some areas of indigenous lands are exempt from resource exploi-
tation by virtue of another Bank policy: OP 4.04 on Natural Habi-
tats.3 31 According to footnote one in OP 4.10, the two policies
"should" be read concurrently. 32 OP 4.04 states that "[t]he Bank
does not support projects that, in the Bank's opinion, involve the sig-
nificant conversion or degradation of critical natural habitats," ' In
OP 4.04, the Bank defines "critical natural habitats" as:
[E]xisting protected areas and areas officially proposed by government as
protected areas (e.g. reserves that meet the criteria of the World Conser-
vation Union [IUCN] classifications) areas initially recognized as pro-
tected by traditional local communities (e.g., sacred groves) and sites that
329. See Final Report Prepared by Mrs. Fatna Zohra Ksentini. Special Rap-
porteur, Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) (recommending inclusion of communications on
ecological matters in ongoing studies.) This followed the Special-Rapporteur's
conclusion in her preliminary report that, given indigenous peoples' unique rela-
tionship with their lands and territories, "all environmental degradation has a direct
impact on the human rights of the indigenous peoples dependent on that environ-
ment." Preliminay
, 
Report Prepared by Airs. Fatna Zohra Ksentini, Special Rap-
porteur, Pursuant to Sub-Commnission Resolutions 1990/7 and 1990/27. Commis-
sion on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, 43rd Sess. Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/8 (1991).
330. See GRIFFITHS & COLCHESTER, supra note 203, at 15 (discussing consulta-
tion between the Bank and indigenous peoples).
331. See generally WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL,
OPERATIONAL POLICIES, OP 4.04 (June 2001) [hereinafter OP 4.04] (outlining the
Bank's Operational Policies toward the conservation of natural habitats), available
at http:// wblnOO18. worldbank.org/ institutional/ manuals] opmanual.nsfi what-
newvirt/ 71432937fa0b753f8525672c007d07aa?opendocument (last visited Nov.
11,2001).
332. DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, n. 1.
333. OP 4.04, supra note 331, para. 4.
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maintain conditions vital for the viability of these protected areas (as de-
ternined by the environmental assessment process)... 334
Assuming the Bank adheres to-not to mention properly under-
stands and applies in practice-this provision, it should provide some
measure of protection for indigenous lands. How much remains to be
seen, particularly when viewed in competition with often lucrative
state, and/or multinational, led resource exploitation operations.
3. Involuntaty Resettlement
While previous drafts of OP 4.10 addressed the issue of involun-
tary resettlement in some detail, 335 the present draft makes only one
334. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL
POLICIES, OP 4.04-ANNEX A, para. I(b)(i) (June 2001), available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf/whatnewvirt/5
d9dc9aef681ba5e8525672c007d07ab?opendocument (last visited Nov. 11,2001).
335. See Draft OP 4.10, supra note 293, paras. 17-20. Paragraphs 17 through 20
state:
17. The policy of the Bank is to avoid involuntary relocation of indigenous
people, or in exceptional cases where it is unavoidable, to minimize it, ex-
ploring all viable alternative project designs. When resettlement activities
take place in Bank-financed projects, they are conceived and executed as de-
velopment programs, offer opportunities for displaced peoples to participate
in their planning and implementation and assist displaced persons in their ef-
forts to improve their livelihoods and standards of living or at least to restore
them. To achieve these objectives, the Bank pays particular attention to the
needs of vulnerable groups including indigenous peoples.
18. When resettlement of indigenous people is unavoidable, the results of the
social assessment, and the proposed mitigation measures should be consistent
with the objectives of this policy and with those of the Bank's Policy on In-
voluntaty Resettlement (OP 4.12). If questions arise, the project should be re-
ferred to the Bank's Social Safeguard Policies Committee for guidance on
further processing of the project.
19. Indigenous peoples displaced from land based livelihoods are provided
with an option of replacement land acceptable to them.
20. In cases where livelihoods of indigenous peoples are adversely affected
due to restrictions imposed on their access to legally designated parks and
protected areas, they should be assisted in their efforts to improve or at least
restore their livelihoods in a manner that maintains the sustainability of the
respective parks and protected areas and is compatible with their culture and
ways of life. In such cases, the borrower prepares a process framework ac-
ceptable to the Bank, as described in the Policy on Involuntary Resettlement
(OP 4.12, Paragraph 6)).
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reference in a footnote to the issue. 336 Draft OP 4.12 on Involuntary
Resettlement is therefore the primary reference point.37 I will deal
with it here for two reasons. First, it illustrates a major deficiency in
OP 4.10: its failure to address an issue of vital importance in the
larger scheme of indigenous peoples' human rights. Second, it per-
mits analysis of another Bank policy on human rights grounds pro-
viding further insight into the overall treatment of indigenous rights
in Bank policies.
International attention has focused on the issue of involuntary re-
settlement in recent years, more than at any other time; it "is consid-
ered a practice that does grave and disastrous harm to the basic civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights of large numbers of
people, both individual persons and collectivities." 3" A Bank study
on resettlement also recognizes this, stating that "[t]he potential for
violating individual and group rights under domestic and interna-
tional law makes compulsory resettlement unlike any other project
activity .... Carrying out resettlement in a manner that respects the
rights of affected persons is not just an issue of compliance with the
law, but also constitutes sound development practice.""'
Forcible relocation can be disastrous for indigenous peoples, sev-
ering entirely their various relationships with their ancestral lands.4
As observed by the U.N. Sub-Commission, "where population trans-
fer is the primary cause for an indigenous people's land loss, it con-
336. See DRAFT OP 4.10, supra note 293, at n.6 (noting briefly that indigenous
people are subject to resettlement plans pursuant to the Bank's policies).
337. See generally DRAFT OP 4.12, supra note 207 (defining the Bank's Opera-
tional Policies with respect to involuntary resettlement).
338. von Boven Report, supra note 151, at 10. See also FORCED EVIC7tONS, su-
pra note 14, paras. 62-72; Report of the Representative of the Secretar.-General,
Mr. Francis Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolu-
tion 1997/39, Addendum, Compilation and Analysis of Legal Norms, Part l/: Legal
Aspects Relating to the Protection against Arbitrar.' Displacement, U.N. Economic
and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 9(d),
§§ I.A-I.G, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411998/53/Add.l (1998) [hereinafter Deng Report
Addendum] (enumerating the various human rights implicated by resettlement).
339. RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at V.
340. See generally Marcus Colchester, Dams, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic
Minorities, INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 1999, at 4-55 (providing an extensive overview
of the impact on indigenous peoples of relocation caused by dams).
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stitutes a principal factor in the process of ethnocide;"34 and, "[for
indigenous peoples, the loss of ancestral land is tantamount to the
loss of cultural life, with all its implications. 342 Other U.N. docu-
ments also describe this as ethnocide. 343
Draft OP 4.12 recognizes the connection between resettlement and
indigenous peoples' cultural integrity, stating in paragraph 9 that:
Bank experience has shown that resettlement of indigenous peoples with
traditional land-based modes of production is particularly complex and
may have significant adverse impacts on their cultural survival. For this
reason, the Bank satisfies itself that the borrower has explored all viable
alternative project designs to avoid physical displacement of these groups.
Where it is not feasible to avoid such displacement, preference is given to
land-based resettlement strategies for these groups that are compatible
with their cultural preferences and are prepared in consultation with
them.
344
Rather than prohibit involuntary resettlement as a gross violation
of indigenous peoples' rights to, among others, cultural integrity and
survival, the Bank will finance activities involving resettlement, even
resulting in significant adverse impacts on their cultural survival, if it
is satisfied that all feasible project design alternatives are explored by
the Borrower.3 45 Paragraph 2(b) of draft OP 4.12 adds that
"[d]isplaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and have op-
341. UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS OF POPULATION
TRANSFER, INCLUDING THE IMPLANTATION OF SETTLERS; PRELIMINARY RiPoRI ,
PREPARED BY MR. A.S. AL-KHASAWNEH AND MR. R. HATANO, 45th Sess.,
Agenda Item 8, para. 101, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17* (1993) [hereinafter
AL-KHASAWNEH REPORT].
342. Id. para. 336.
343. See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 240, art. 7 ("Indigenous Peoples
have the collective and individual right not to be subjected to ethnocide or cultural
genocide, including prevention of and redress for: ... (b) Any action which has the
aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c) Any
form of population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining
any of their rights.").
344. DRAFT OP 4.12, supra note 207.
345. Id. para. 6 (detailing the Bank's required measures concerning the prepara-
tion of a resettlement plan or resettlement policy framework).
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portunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement
programs. 346 Despite the language of the Bank report quoted above,
highlighting respect for the rights of affected persons, OP 4.12 stands
in sharp contrast to indigenous peoples' rights as defined by interna-
tional law. Two immediate concerns are the failure to require that
consent be obtained prior to relocation and the complete disregard
for indigenous peoples' cultural rights.
Due to the importance attached to indigenous cultural, spiritual,
and economic relationships to land and resources, international law
treats relocation as a serious human rights issue? International in-
struments employ strict standards of scrutiny and require that indige-
nous peoples' free and informed consent be obtained. Relocation
may only be considered as an exceptional measure in extreme and
extraordinary cases. Implicit in these standards is the statement that
forcible relocation is prohibited as a "gross violation of human
rights." '349 The report of the Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
346. DRAFT OP 4.12, supra note 207, para. 2(b).
347. U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, SUB-COMMISSION
RESOLUTION 1996/36, para. 5, E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1996/36 (1996) (mandating, for
instance, the Special-Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to include indigenous
land rights within in his or her reports on state compliance with the Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, and inviting the Special-
Rapporteur to "take into account the spiritual relationship that indigenous commu-
nities have with the land and the significance of traditional lands for the practice of
their religion, and to examine the history of events which are responsible for the
violation of these communities' right to freedom of religion and religious prac-
tice.").
348. See ILO 107, supra note 280, art. 12; ILO 169, supra note 274, art. 16(2);
U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 240, art. 10; PROPOSED AMERICAN
DECLARATION, supra note 269, art. XVIII(6); Gen. Rec. ILVIII, supra note 251,
para. 5 (regarding the standards and policies international organizations use with
respect to indigenous peoples).
349. Forced Evictions, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/77, U.N.
Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, para. 1,
E/CN.4/RES/1993/77 (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 1993/77] (urging govern-
ments: to undertake immediate measures, at all levels, aimed at eliminating the
practice; to offer legal security of tenure on all persons currently threatened with
forced eviction; and to adopt all necessary measures giving full protection against
forced eviction, based upon effective participation, consultation, and negotiation
with affected persons or groups).
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General on this issue concludes that "an express prohibition of arbi-
trary displacement is contained in humanitarian law and in the law
relating to indigenous peoples,""35 and:
Efforts should be made to obtain the free and informed consent of those to
be displaced. Where these guarantees are absent, displacement would be
arbitrary and therefore unlawful. Special protection should be afforded to
indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups
with a special dependency on and attachment to their lands."
351
Another report finds that the principle of consent has obtained the
status of a binding general principle of international law. 352 Finally,
the IACHR has found that "[t]he preponderant doctrine" holds that
the principle of consent is of general application to cases involving
relocation. 35 3
From the preceding, it is clear that international law requires the
obtainment of consent prior to resettlement and that this is a principle
of customary international law binding on the Bank. It is also clear
that international law accords indigenous peoples, given their unique
connection with their lands and resources, a higher standard of pro-
tection than applies to others. This higher standard in part entails a
substantial, if not complete, limitation on the exercise of eminent
domain powers by the state. For these reasons, the European Union,
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Commission
on Dams all prohibit relocation absent indigenous peoples' con-
sent.354 The Bank itself was heavily involved in the creation of the
350. Internally Displaced Persons, Report of the Representative of the Secre-
taty-General, Mi-. Francis Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Ihuman
Rights Resolution 1997/39, U.N., Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 9(d), § L.A. para. 2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53 (1998).
351. Id. § I.A, para. 4.
352. See Deng Report Addendum, supra note 338, § IV, para. 4 (detailing how
the principle of consent has achieved the status as a general principle of interna-
tional law).
353. See Miskito Report, supra note 267, at 120 (establishing that relocation of
Indigenous peoples may be valid if accomplished with their consent).
354. See EUROPEAN UNION, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF
30 NOVEMBER 1998, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF TIlE
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OF THE COMMUNITY AND THE MEMBER STATES, para.
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World Commission on Dams.
355
Again, given the fundamental physical, cultural, spiritual, and
other relationships that indigenous peoples have with their lands and
resources, forcible resettlement amounts to a gross violation of a se-
5 (1998) (clarifying the European Union's position on the relocation of indigenous
peoples, and stating "indigenous peoples have the right to choose their own devel-
opment paths, which includes the right to object to projects, in particular in their
additional areas"), available at http:f europa.eu.int/ comnmt development/ lex/ en/
pdf/res_98_indigen.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2001); INTrER-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: OPERATIONAL POLICY AND
BACKGROUND PAPER, OPERATIONAL POLICY OP-7 10 § IV, para. 4 (1998) [herein-
after OP-710], available at http://www.iadb.orglsds/doc!928eng.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2001). OP-170 established the Inter-American Development Bank's pol-
icy on involuntary resettlement of indigenous peoples, and asserted that:
Those indigenous and other low-income ethnic minority communities whose
identity is based on the territory they have traditionally occupied are particu-
larly vulnerable to the disruptive and impoverishing effects of resettlement.
They often lack formal property rights to the areas on which they depend for
their subsistence, and find themselves at a disadvantage in pressing their
claims for compensation and rehabilitation. The Bank will, therefore, only
support operations that involve the displacement of indigenous communities
or other low-income ethnic minority communities in rural areas, if the Bank
can ascertain that: the resettlement component will result in direct benefits to
the affected community relative to their prior situation; customary rights will
be fully recognized and fairly compensated; compensation options will in-
clude land-based resettlement, and the people affected have given their in-
formed consent to the resettlement and compensation measures.
Id. (emphasis added). See also WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND
DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING, TIlE REPORT OF THE
WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS 112 (2000) ("The scope of international law has
widened and currently includes a body of conventional and customary norms con-
cerning indigenous peoples, grounded on self-determination. In a context of in-
creasing recognition of the self-determination of indigenous peoples, the principle
of free, prior, and informed consent to development projects and plans affecting
these groups has emerged as the standard to be applied in protecting and promoting
fights in the development process."). See also id. at 267, 271, 278 (establishing
guidelines of gaining public acceptance during different stages of the application
of strategic priorities process, i.e., having ndigenous peoples give their free, prior,
and informed consent to the project designed).
355. See Press Release, Berne Declaration, NGOs Protest Against World Bank
Position on World Dams Report (Mar. 3, 2001) (explaining that despite its sub-
stantial involvement in and praise for the multi-stakeholder approach adopted by
the World Commission on Dams, the Bank has refused to adopt its recommenda-
tions, which is a move heavily criticized by NGOs and others involved), available
at http://www.evb.chlindex.cfm?page-id=551&yy=2001 (last visited Nov. 11,
2001).
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ries of human rights cumulatively defined as cultural integrity.156 It
certainly amounts to a violation of Article 27 of the JCCPR and Arti-
cle 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in that it is a de-
nial of the right of indigenous persons and children, respectively, to
enjoy their culture.357 Articles 27 and 30 are one manifestation of the
general norm of international law relating to the right to cultural in-
tegrity, a norm binding on the Bank.35 Also, in the jurisprudence of
the IACHR, forcible relocation equals a violation of human rights
"essential to the right to life of peoples." 3 59
The paragraphs of OP 4.12 requiring compensation and provision
of lands of equal value do not alter the conclusion reached in the pre-
ceding paragraph.360 Commenting on forcible relocation, Sharon
Venne, an indigenous lawyer, states that:
Does no one realize that our relationship to the land is to a particular
place? There seems to be an assumption that any land will be adequate. In
our worldview, the land which identifies us does not change like the wind.
Removing us from our land base is, in fact, to take away our life force.
36 1
With regard to compensation, a U.N. report concludes that
"[m]onetary compensation for relocating indigenous peoples raises a
number of very difficult questions. Past experience has demonstrated
that monetary compensation is actually an effective contribution to
the demise of entire indigenous peoples and has resulted in the im-
poverishment and marginalization of most tribal and indigenous peo-
356. Resolution 1993/77, supra note 349, para. 1.
357. See generally Ominayak, Lovelace, L Lansman, and J. Lansman, supra
note 257 (exemplifying violations of Article 27 of the ICCPR).
358. See Anaya, supra note 260, at 15-19 (discussing cultural integrity of in-
digenous peoples as it relates to Article 27). See generalv Lyndel V. Prott, Cidi-
tural Rights as Peoples Rights in International Law, in THE RIGI ITS OF PEOPLES 93
(J. Crawford ed., 1988) (defining cultural rights and explaining their relation to
Article 27).
359. Guatemala Report, supra note 267.
360. DRAFT OP 4.12, supra note 207, paras. 9-11 (discussing measures for pro-
viding land or cash compensation to relocated peoples).
361. S. Venne, The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of ILO
Convention No. 169, 11 WITHOUT PREJUDICE: EAFORD INT'L REV. OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 53, 63.
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ples thus relocated. 3 62 The report cites a World Bank study to reach
this conclusion.3 63
In light of the preceding, the Bank's statement to the U.N. World
Conference Against Racism, held in South Africa in 2001, comes as
a surprise. Presented by a Bank Vice-President, the statement read in
part that:
Culture, for example, was once thought to be little more than a novel en-
dowment that history gave each people - their language, their art and tra-
ditions. We now know better. We know that culture is the fertile field
necessary for both individual inspiration and common ventures. It is a
precondition of productivity and progress. For no person will work be-
yond mere sustenance without a reason, a larger cause, or a dream. Cul-
ture supplies those. A carpenter can build a house, but it takes culture to
make a home. That is why we have put strong safeguards in our policies
to protect indigenous cultures. We recognize that each culture is a price-
less tapestry of history that cannot be replaced. It must be preserved and
respected, especially in this era of globalization 364
To conclude this section, the Bank's draft policy on Involuntary
Resettlement directly contravenes at least two norms of customary
international law. These norms are binding on the Bank, requiring at
a minimum that Bank polices account for and respect them. The
damage caused to indigenous peoples by involuntary resettlement is
by its nature irreparable and therefore must be avoided at all costs.
By failing to address this issue, OP 4.10 again falls far short of en-
suring that the "development process fosters full respect for the dig-
nity, human rights and cultures of indigenous peoples."365
362. AL-KHASA\VNEH REPORT, supra note 341, para. 259.
363. Id. para. 259 (citing THE WORLD BANK, SOCIAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH
INVOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT IN BANK-FINANCED PROJECTS, OPERATIONAL MANUAL
STATEMENT 2.33, para. 19 (February 1980)).
364. Mats Karlsson, Remarks at the World Conference Against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Sept. 2, 2001), at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/mksp090201.htm (last visited Nov.
11,2001).
365. DRAFTOP 4.10, supra note 293, para. 1.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has addressed two primary issues: the juridical theories
under which the Bank may, and indeed does, have legal obligations
to account for and respect human rights as the latter apply to its in-
ternal and external policies and operations; and the compatibility of
its draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples with human
rights standards, especially those pertaining to indigenous peoples'
territorial rights, participation rights, and right to be free from invol-
untary resettlement. The two issues are closely related as the general
obligation of the Bank to account for and respect human rights ap-
plies also to its internal policies, at least those that may affect human
rights. On the first issue, I conclude that the Bank does have obliga-
tions, derived from a variety of sources, to account for and respect
human rights. On the second issue, I conclude, that these obligations
have not been met with regard to OP 4.10 which is clearly sub-
standard in human rights terms and fails to account for and respect
indigenous peoples' rights binding on the Bank.
The juridical bases of the Bank's human rights obligations are far
more complex than can be discussed here, and ultimately involve a
series of difficult decisions about the relationship between and hier-
archy among different norms and subject areas of international law.
This said, it is safe to say that, as a subject of international law with
rights, duties, and responsibility under that law, the Bank is required
to respect and comply with the norms and principles that apply gen-
erally in the international legal system. These norms and principles
include human rights characterized as peremptory norms, customary
international law, and general principles of law. The Bank's obliga-
tions, given their source, are primarily to respect human rights. This
is largely a negative duty requiring that the Bank account for and re-
frain from violating or acting inconsistently with human rights.
While it is not precluded from setting higher standards, the Bank also
has a neutral obligation to respect existing levels of protection ac-
corded to human rights by international law. Failure to comply with
this obligation triggers international responsibility.
The Bank is not a universe unto itself. It operates within the inter-
national legal system and, with the exception of those rights and du-
ties by their nature inherently limited to states (e.g. rights and duties
associated with territorial sovereignty), is required to conduct itself
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in the manner prescribed by that system. It has been said that "viola-
tions of human rights offend the international legal order,"3 and that
violations of the basic rights of human beings give rise to obligations
erga omnes, obligations to the international community as a whole.167
One of the primary purposes and principles of the United Nations,
reaffirmed numerous times, is promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights. The Bank is a member of the U.N. family with duties
in relation to the U.N. and its Charter and the human rights law that
flows from the Charter. However, not only has the Bank never (at
least publicly) acknowledged that it has obligations towards human
rights, it repeatedly asserts that it is precluded from addressing-in
Shihata's opinion, even discussing-many human rights by virtue of
its Articles of Agreement. Yet, this Agreement is subject to interna-
tional law and must be interpreted consistently therewith.
The Bank is also a forum for the collective action of its Members,
each of whom have substantial obligations to respect, protect, and
ensure human rights as defined by ratified conventions and general
rules of international law. The Bank is obliged to respect and account
for the obligations of its Members and to refrain from undermining
their ability to faithfully comply with, or assisting in the violation of,
those obligations. What this entails in practice is largely dependent
upon the specific obligations of each member and how they are im-
plicated in a given project or program. For the Bank, at the policy
level, this obligation can in part be met by inclusion of a requirement
that it will not finance activities that contravene its Members' inter-
national obligations, such as that found in the OPs on Environmental
Assessment and Forests.
Collectively, and in the context of OP 4.10, the preceding requires
that the OP be drafted and applied so as: not to violate existing levels
of protection accorded to indigenous peoples' human rights; to be
consistent with the Bank's obligations to respect human rights de-
rived from customary international law, peremptory norms, and gen-
eral principles of law, as well as the obligations the Bank has by vir-
tue of the U.N. Charter and the human rights law that authoritatively
interprets the Charter; and to account for and respect its Members'
366. MERON, supra note 15 1, at 192.
367. See Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 4 (explaining the nature of obliga-
tions erga omnes).
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international human rights obligations. The same can also be said for
OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement, which is substantially at odds
with international customary norms.
I will conclude by offering a few general thoughts on how the ob-
ligations of the Bank can be operationalized. Ideally, the Bank
should adopt a general policy on human rights that will set out the
framework for and prescribe specific measures for addressing human
rights on an institutional and operational level.36 This policy should
be developed and written with the participation and agreement of
U.N. bodies charged with human rights matters and be, at a mini-
mum, consistent with the Bank's obligations, bodies charged with
human rights matters should develop and write this policy with full
participation and agreement and, at a minimum, be consistent with
the Bank's obligations. An in-house unit with expertise in human
rights will should also be established to provide preliminary screen-
ing of projects and programs. Also, Bank staff should receive human
rights training.
The Bank should undertake further screening in cooperation with
U.N. and other human rights bodies. Some degree of cooperation
between U.N. human rights treaty bodies and the Specialized Agen-
cies is provided for by the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cuil-
tural Rights,3"' the Convention on the Rights of the Child,3 711 the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 71 and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.372 Where not provided for, as in the case of the
368. See Bradlow, supra note 15, at 80-89 (discussing potential elements to be
included in a general human rights policy that could be adopted by the Bank).
369. See International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, arts. 18 and 22, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing the Economic and Social
Council the ability to cooperate with other U.N. organs and agencies for the pur-
pose of implementing the Covenant).
370. See CRC, supra note 259, art. 45 (establishing guidelines for the Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child for fostering the performance of the Convention).
371. See CERD, supra note 31, arts. 15(1), 16, 60 U.N.T.S. 195 (providing for
cooperation among international instruments).
372. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1981, art. 22, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (determining the framework for
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women for working
with the other agencies within the U.N.).
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Economic and Social
Council may coordinate cooperation pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
U.N. Charter. 37 3 This would also include cooperation with Charter-
based bodies under ECOSOC such as the Commission on Human
Rights and its Sub-Commission. In the case of indigenous peoples,
specific cooperation agreements can be made with either or both the
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Sub-Commission's
Working Group on Indigenous Populations.37 Regional human rights
bodies can also play a valuable role in this respect.
The human rights obligations of the Bank apply to most levels of
its activity, including Operational Policies; Bank programs, such as
structural adjustment; country level strategies; specific projects; and
compliance mechanisms, such as the Inspection Panel. If the Bank is
to comply with its minimum obligation to respect human rights, a
number of measures are required. One has already been mentioned:
inclusion of language in Operational Polices prohibiting Bank-
financing of activities that contravene its members' international
human rights obligations.
Implementation of this language will require screening of projects
against human rights criteria and an examination of country-specific
obligations. Country-specific obligations can be built into and inform
373. See International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 63(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (providing that ECOSOC "may coordinate the activi-
ties of the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and rec-
ommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General As-
sembly and to the Members of the United Nations").
374. See Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the Economic anl Social Coun-
cil at its Substantive Session of 2000, U.N. Economic and Social Council, at 52,
U.N. Doe. E/2000/INF/2/Add.2 (2000). The resolutions and decisions established
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues through ECOSOC Resolution 2000/22,
and providing that it:
[S]hall serve as an advisory body to the Council with a mandate to discuss the
indigenous issues within the mandate of the Council relating to economic and
social development, culture, the environment, education, health and human
rights; in so doing the Permanent Forum shall: (a) Provide expert advice and
recommendations on indigenous issues to the Council, as it-ell as to pro-
grannes, funds and agencies of the United Nations. through the Council; (b)
Raise awareness and promote the integration and coordination of activities
relating to indigenous issues within the United Nations system; (c) Prepare
and disseminate information on indigenous issues.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Country Assistance Strategies, which are country-specific plans ne-
gotiated between the Bank and Borrowers that set the broad parame-
ters and priorities for Bank support, and which may reduce the bur-
den of project-by-project evaluation. This can also be done for
Structural Adjustment Programs. In both cases, the Bank and its Bor-
rowers must incorporate specific, enforceable, and verifiable legal
covenants into their and other agreements. The Bank will have to en-
sure that its projects and programs are in fact respectful of human
rights. Given that the principle of free and informed consent is fun-
damental to indigenous peoples' rights, enforceable tripartite (In-
digenous peoples, the Bank, and the Borrower) loan covenants also
could be negotiated and incorporated by the Bank into agreements
affecting indigenous peoples. Further, the Bank can screen Opera-
tional Policies to determine if they are consistent with its human
rights obligations, which would provide an additional level of up-
front screening for projects. Finally, the Bank could adopt a rights-
based approach to development, specifically tying its projects to, and
requiring that they meet and fulfill, international human rights stan-
dards.
Undoubtedly, the preceding will complicate the work of the Bank
and will ultimately change the way in which it does business. Flow-
ever, the changes would not greatly differ from those associated with
incorporating sustainable development, good governance, and other
criteria into its work. Moreover, as presented here, this is not a mat-
ter of discretion for the Bank, but a matter of compliance with its in-
ternational legal obligations. Surely the Bank is required to follow
the same rule of law that it requires of its Borrowers.
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